University of the Pacific

Scholarly Commons
McGeorge School of Law Scholarly Articles

McGeorge School of Law Faculty Scholarship

1997

Power Outage: Amplifying the Analysis of Power in Legal
Relations (With Special Application to Unconscionability and
Arbitration)
Michael Hunter Schwartz
University of the Pacific, McGeorge School of Law, mschwartz@pacific.edu

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarlycommons.pacific.edu/facultyarticles
Part of the Law and Society Commons, and the Legal Profession Commons

Recommended Citation
Michael Hunter Schwartz, Power Outage: Amplifying the Analysis of Power in Legal Relations (with
Special Application to Unconscionability and Arbitration), 33 Willamette L. Rev. 67, 70 (1997).

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the McGeorge School of Law Faculty Scholarship at
Scholarly Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in McGeorge School of Law Scholarly Articles by an
authorized administrator of Scholarly Commons. For more information, please contact mgibney@pacific.edu.

POWER OUTAGE: AMPLIFYING THE ANALYSIS OF
POWER IN LEGAL RELATIONS (WITH SPECIAL
APPLICATION TO UNCONSCIONABILITY
AND ARBITRATION)
MICHAEL HuNTER ScHwARTz*

TABLE OF CONTENTS

I. Introduction . . . . .. . .. . .. . . . . . . .. . . . .. . .. . . . . .. . . . . . .
A. The Nature of Power...........................
B. Overview of Article .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ..
II. The Importance of Power .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ..
A. The Intersection of Power and the Law . . . . . . . .
1. Power as a Specific Consideration in
Contemporary Legal Doctrine . . . . . . . . . . . . .
a. Power in Contract Doctrine . . . . . . . . . . . .
b. Power in Emotional Distress Doctrine .
c. Power in Antidiscrimination Law . . . . . .
2. The Subtle Power Ramifications of
Specific Legal Doctrine .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ..
3. Law and the Legal System as Instruments
of and Discourses About Power . . . . . . . . . . .
4. Empowerment as a Standard by Which
the Legal System Can Be Measured . . . . . . .
B. Power as a Means of Maintaining Social
Control.........................................
C. The Interpersonal Meaning and Effects of
Power...........................................
III. A Model of Interpersonal Power . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
A. Sources for the Model.. .. .. .. . . . .. .. .. . . . . . . . . .
1. The "Vector" Idea. . . . . . . . . . . . . .. .. . . . . . . . . .
2. The Vectors of Power . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . .
a. Force Power . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

69
70
74
77
77
77
78
79
80
81
83
84
85
85
87
87
89
89
90

• Assistant Professor, Western State University College of Law. J.D., Hastings
College of the Law 1987. I am grateful to Neil Gotanda, Susan Keller, Edith Warkentine, Leslie Dery, and my wife, Dr. Stacey Hunter Schwartz, for critical assistance and
encouragement. I am also grateful to my two research assistants, Nancy McCoy and
Renee Lewis, for their assistance. This Article is dedicated to my family, Stacey,
Samantha, and Kendra.

67

68

WILLAMETTE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 33:67

b. Enfranchisement Power ................
c. Social Custom Power ...................
(i) Status Social Custom Power .......
(ii) Personal Associations Social
Custom Power .....................
(iii) Social Norms, Traditions, and
Values Social Custom Power .......
d. Compact Power ........................
(i) Coercive Compact Power ..........
(ii) Reward Compact Power ...........
e. Information (Knowledge) Power .......
f. Expert Power ..........................
g. Reference Power .......................
h. Perceived Trustworthiness Power ......
1.
Personal Qualities Power ...............
j. Manipulation Power ....................
k. Discourse Power .......................
B. Limitations on and Complexities in the Model
of Power ........................................
1. Reductionist Nature of Modeling ..........
2. Inability to Verify Model ...................
3. Indeterminacy of Power Classification
Process .....................................
4. Intersection and Interrelationship of the
Vectors of Power ...........................
IV. Application of the Power Model to the
Unconscionability Doctrine and to the Analysis of
Arbitration as a Means of Dispute Resolution .....
A. Unconscionability ..............................
1. Background of the Doctrine ...............
2. Analytical Perspective ......................
3. The Analysis of Power in
Unconscionability Cases ....................
a. The Contract of Adhesion Approach ..
b. The Knowing Assent Approach ........
c. The Multivariable Approach ...........
4. The Power Model as a Tool for Analyzing
Procedural Unconscionability ..............
a. Williams v. Walker- Thomas Furniture
Company ...............................
b. In re Baby "M" ........................

90
92
93
94
95
97
97
97
98
98
99
99
100
100
101
102
102
103
103
104
105
105
105
107
109
109
112
115
120
121
124

1997]

POWER ANALYSIS OF LEGAL RELATIONS

c.

v.

Summary: Application of the Power
Model to Unconscionability Analysis ..
B. Arbitration as a Means of Dispute Resolution .
1. Introduction ................................
2. Past Scholarly Analysis of Power in
Arbitration .................................
3. The Power Model Applied to Arbitration
as a Means of Dispute Resolution .........
4. Vectors of Power in the Arbitration
Process .....................................
5. Summary: Application of the Power
Model to Arbitration .......................
Conclusion ..........................................

69

I.

131
132
132
134
135
136

142
142

INTRODUCTION

With increasing frequency, courts, legislators, and particularly commentators explicitly consider issues of power in the
many human interactions the law addresses. These discussions
of "the power relationship," of "empowerment," or of "disempowerment" respond to dissatisfaction with the legal system and
with particular legal doctrines. 1 The prevalence of such scholarship, statutes, and case opinions suggests a need for careful examination of the bases or contours of power. This examination
has not occurred. Power is assumed to be a unitary, self-evident
concept. 2 The potential and actual harm caused by the use, possession, and lack of power captures the scholarly, legislative, and
judicial attention.
We view human power much as we view electrical power.
Only the end products of electrical power are important to us,
such as lighting for courtrooms, offices, and classrooms. The
1. See infra notes 26-71 and accompanying text.
2. See, e.g., W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF
TORTS § 12, at 61 (5th ed. 1984) (noting that power is relevant to the emotional distress
doctrine without defining or explaining the term "power"). Those authors who recognize that power may not be either unitary or self-evident, nevertheless, present only
limited visions of power. See, e.g., Penelope E. Bryan, Reclaiming Professionalism: The
Lawyer's Role in Divorce Mediation, 28 FAM. L.Q. 177, 194-207 n.25 (1994) (listing five
"bases" of power without explanation or examination); Scott H. Hughes, Elizabeth's
Story: Exploring Power Imbalances in Divorce Mediation, 8 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 553,
574-75 (1995) (inventing five power "areas"). Neither Bryan nor Hughes actually develops or justifies a model of power, and both fail to explore the larger implications of
their ideas about power.
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process of how electrical power works-the force of attraction
created when an electron and proton are brought close to each
other3-is irrelevant to us. Similarly, we know human power
matters because we can see the products of human power's operation: constriction of the spectrum of political and legal discussion, unfair contractual bargains, subjugation, discrimination,
battered women, low-quality justice, and harassment of persons
who possess relatively little power. The discourse on human
power, with its focus on the products of power, seldom confronts
the sources of the exercised power.
This Article analyzes the sources of power. Specifically, I
weave together ideas from the fields of law, psychology, and philosophy to create a multidimensional model of power. I then
demonstrate the usefulness of the model for legal analysis and
for legal systems analysis. I begin my analysis by situating my
model in the context of current legal, psychological, and philosophical thinking regarding the nature of power.
The Nature of Power

A.

Even though power is perceived as important and influential in human interactions and experiences, there is no genuine
consensus of what power is. 4 Nearly all theorists who have discussed power, however, have suggested a particular vision.
Power theorists may be seen as being part of one of two camps,
"the traditional camp" and the "Foucauldian camp." Although
traditional theorists focus mostly on interpersonal power and
Foucauldians focus mostly on social power, each implicates the
other. The real difference between the two camps is in the aspects of power they examine. Foucauldians focus on the effectivity or operationality of power, whereas traditionalists focus on
the source of power. The model presented here draws from both
camps.
Theorists in the traditional camp, many of whom are social
psychologists or have been influenced by the large body of social
psychology power scholarship, view power mostly as a personal
3. CONCISE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF SCIENCE & TECHNOLOGY 664 (Sybil P. Parker ed.,
1987).

4. James T. Tedeschi & Thomas U. Bonoma, Power and Influence: An Introduction, in THE SOCIAL INFLUENCE PROCESS 1, 2-8 (James T. Tedeschi ed., 1972).
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property. 5 Although the actual phrasing of this idea changes depending on the theorist's linguistic preference, typically power is
defined as the capacity to secure compliance against another's
will. 6 There are three key ideas to the traditional camp's understanding of power: (1) power is a personal faculty; (2) power
reflects a potential for obtaining desired ends through its use;
and (3) power implies an ability to obtain the compliance of another, contrary to that other's preferences. 7
Thus, to these theorists, power means interpersonal power.
The idea of interpersonal power, however, implicates social
power. By the term "interpersonal power," traditional theorists
(at least recent commentators) communicate something broader
than the simple person-to-person power relationship. The term
also includes any relationship between one person, group, or organization and any other person, group or organization. 8 Thus,
traditional theorists believe that power resides in individuals,
groups, or organizations and involves the potential to exact a desired response from other individuals, groups, or organizations.
Those in the other camp believe, as Michel Foucault argues,
that "[p]ower is neither given, nor exchanged, nor recovered . . . it only exists in action. . . . Power . . . is above all a
relation of force. "9 Foucauldian theorists believe that power
constructs reality through a pervasive social discourse, expressed
5. See, e.g., Arthur J. Jacobson, Modem American Jurisprudence and the Problem
of Power, 6 CARDOZO L. REv. 713 (1985); David Kipnis, The Use of Power in Organizations and in Interpersonal Settings, 5 APPLIED Soc. PSYCHOL. ANN.: APPLICATION IN
ORGANIZATIONAL SETTINGS 179 (Stuart Oskemp ed., 1984); Bertram H. Raven, A
Power/Interaction Model of Interpersonal Influence: French and Raven Thirty Years
Later, 7 J. Soc. BEHAV. & PERSONALITY 217 (1992).
6. Tedeschi & Bonoma, supra note 4. BARRY BARNES, THE NATURE OF PowER
20 (1988) ("Power is the generalized capacity to secure the performance of political

obligations, and serves as an exchange medium in a system of specific capacities to
secure the performance of political obligations."); Henry L. Muiton, Power and Personality, in THE SOCIAL INFLUENCE PROCESS, supra note 4, at 100-01 ("Power can be conceptualized as the ability to overcome resistance in the course of obtaining intended
effects.").
7. I regard any performance in compliance with another's will as contrary to one's
own will because the motivation for the performance is not self-generated.
8. See, e.g., Raven, A Power/Interaction Model, supra note 5, at 235 (discussing
hospitals' efforts to influence hospital staff); Anthony T. Cobb, Informal Influence in
the Formal Organization: Psychological and Situational Correlates, 11 GROUP & 0RG.
STUD., 229, 234 (1986) (noting the intersection of interpersonal and work group power).
9. Michel Foucault, Two Lectures, in PowERIKNOWLEDGE: SELECTED INTER·
VIEWS AND OTHER WRITINGS 89 (Colin Gordon ed., Colin Gordon et al. trans., 1980).
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as a set of truths, needs, images, and ideas. 10 Power, therefore, is
a complex, mobile, collective force that at least appears to set
boundaries of what is possible in society and is only truly meaningful in its exercise.
According to Allan Hutchinson, the traditional theorists' focus on interpersonal manifestations of power "obscures its more
subtle and pervasive dimensions. " 11 As Hutchinson recognizes,
however, interpersonal interactions do matter, even under a
Foucauldian analysis. He argues that power operates "not only
through discursive practices ... but also through roles assigned
and assumed in social practices. " 12 Foucault suggests that the
relationship between pervasive social power and interpersonal
interactions is even more complicated than Hutchinson indicates. According to Foucault, power is omnipresent "because it
is produced from one moment to the next, at every point, or,
rather, in every relation from one point to another." 13 More importantly, power occurs in human interactions: "Power is everywhere; not because it embraces everything, but because it comes
from everywhere. " 14
In short, interpersonal power cannot be separated from pervasive social power and discursive practices. Instead, pervasive
social power and discursive practices are imbricated with interpersonal power and vice-versa. In each human interaction, conversation, writing, and reading, both interpersonal power and
pervasive social power operate dependently, independently, sequentially, and nonsequentially. Each is, establishes, manifests,
and reinforces the other. 15
The link between interpersonal and pervasive social power
10. Allan C. Hutchinson, Part of an Essay on Power and Interpretation (With Suggestions on How to Make Bouillabaisse), 60 N.Y.U. L. REv. 850, 877 (1985). See also
Richard Delgado, Shadowboxing: An Essay on Power, 77 CORNELL.L. REv. 813, 818
(1992) (arguing that through repetition, the dominant stories, narratives, myths, and
symbols become accepted as true depictions of the world).
11. Hutchinson, supra note 10, at 875.
12. Hutchinson, supra note 10, at 881 (emphasis added). Although I generally
agree with Hutchinson on this point, I believe his analysis is incomplete. I do not perceive such a clear demarcation between interpersonal interactions and discursive practices. To me, each makes and is made by the other, so much so that a beginning and an
end are indecipherable.
13. MICHEL FOUCAULT, THE HISTORY OF SEXUALITY 94 (Robert Hurley trans.,
1978) (emphasis added).
14. /d.
15. Although I believe the imbrication of interpersonal power and pervasive so-
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stems from the automatic process by which interpersonal power
is exercised. The exercise of power often occurs on subtle, subconscious levels. Contrary to the assertions of many traditional
theorists that power is exercised volitionally and consciously,16
power often is communicated, understood, and exercised without intent or awarenessP For example, imagine that a middleaged, able-bodied, white male enters the room in which you are
reading this Article. Even as this image enters your mind, you
form conclusions about his power in our society based solely on
his age, skin color, sex, and ability to walk. The mental "training" we have received from a lifetime of images, slogans, and
ideas confers and exercises the man's interpersonal power without his saying a word. His power is exercised automatically.
In this sense, every human interaction is power-mediated.
We send messages about our power through our physical characteristics, the way we move, our tone of voice, the words we use,
misuse, and choose not to use, the clothes we wear, the items we
display in our offices, and countless other details of our existence. Moreover, each power-mediated interaction between an
individual, group, or organization and another individual, group,
or organization recapitulates, reinforces, and re-establishes the
power story. 18 Each time we experience an interpersonal power
cial power helps perpetuate the existing social structure, I do not purport to address, in
this Article, how that mechanism works.
16. See, e.g., Bertram H. Raven & Arie W. Kruglanski, Conflict And Power, in
THE STRUCTURE OF CONFLICT 69, 69-70 (Paul Swingle ed., 1970); Kipnis, supra note 5,
at 184.
17. Steven Winter makes a similar point in his recent insightful discussion of
power from a fairly strict Foucauldian perspective. Steven L. Winter, The 'Power'
Thing, 82 VA. L. REv. 721, 830-32 (1996) (arguing that power relations are an "interpretive institution" influenced by "inequalities in access to resources and legitimate
powers ... [and) [i]nequalities in psychological and emotional states").
18. My experience as a law professor inclined to minimize the power imbalance
between my students and me illustrates the pervasiveness and subtle operation of both
discursive social power and interpersonal power. For several years now, I have asked
my students to refer to me by my first name and have promised to refer to them by
whatever name they chose. I believed this practice addressed (in a small way) some of
the power imbalance. In fact, the assertion of interpersonal power imbedded in my
policy very likely served to enhance my power. By acknowledging my power to control
both their manner of addressing me and my manner of addressing them, I reinforced
my power. In fact, by insisting they call me by my first name, I may have disempowered
those whose educational experiences or cultural values made them feel uncomfortable
with my preference for informal address.
Also, the policy seems to suggest that I am somehow different from their other
professors. This suggestion also enhanced my power because it was a misleading sug-
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interaction (and such experiences occur many times a day), we
deliver a message of acquiescence to the power-mediated nature
of that interaction. In fact, even a protest of the power in an
interaction acknowledges and, arguably, reinforces the powermediated nature of the interaction. 19 This process of automatic
exercise coupled with automatic assent places interpersonal
power interactions at the core of the concern about power. Interpersonal power, therefore, is, manifests, re-establishes, and
reinforces pervasive social power.
From this perspective, power is a socially constructed and
mediated capacity that is manifest and immanent throughout all
human experience; and all human experience operates through
small interpersonal power interactions. Because power operates
in such a complex, often unseen yet large and varied tableau, a
unitary meaning of "power" makes no sense. Instead, it makes
more sense to regard power as multidimensional. Accordingly,
to capture the complexity of power, this Article articulates a
multidimensional model of power.

B.

Overview of Article

In Part II of this Article, I elaborate on the importance of
power to law, to society, and to each individual in society. First,
I argue that power is important because it intersects with the law
in at least four important ways: (1) power relations are a specific
doctrinal consideration for certain legal issues; (2) power underlies or should underlie the analysis of other doctrinal issues;
(3) law and lawmaking are a discourse about and a means to
enforce and maintain power; and (4) power and empowerment
are standards by which our governmental and legal systems can
be measured. Second, I argue that power is important because it
gestion. Students typically perceive grading as their most important interaction with
their professors. I, like all their professors, intended to grade their work; therefore, I
would be helping to place them in the artificial hierarchy created by my school's grading
system. As I suggest in Part III of this Article, misleading is a technique for obtaining
and preserving power.
19. See generally EVE K. SEDGWICK, EPISTEMOLOGY OF THE CLosET 10 (1990)
(arguing that a deconstructive analysis of power is not sufficient, standing alone, to
disable the power involved). Sedgwick believes that such an analysis is "necessary." /d.
This Article reflects my belief that identification of power is necessary, and application
of my ideas about power to the existing structure of unconscionability doctrine is my
attempt to make the analysis of power a disabling force, even within the current legal
structure.
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is a means of maintaining social control. Finally, I argue that
power is important because Western psychologists perceive
power as a basic human need, and also because a powerholder is
likely to abuse her power.20
In Part III of this Article, I describe and explain the model
of power I have developed. I look to the considerable body of
social psychology research and theory, and I create a model of
power that is a synthesis, expansion, and reorganization of these
works in light of the Foucauldian insight into the nature of
power. At the core of this model is my perspective on the link
between Foucauldian ideas of pervasive, discursive social power
and traditional ideas of interpersonal power. I argue that interpersonal power is a complex interaction of the following vectors:21 (1) enfranchisement, (2) force, (3) social customs (based
on status, social norms, values, traditions, and personal associations), (4) compact (based on giving or taking away things of
value to the target), (5) information (knowledge that has persuasive force), (6) expertise (from education, training, or experience), (7) reference (from a desire by the target for social
acceptance and identification by and with the powerholder),
(8) perceived trustworthiness of the powerholder, (9) personal
qualities (such as charisma, determination, and calmness), and
(10) manipulation. An eleventh vector, discourse power, can be
seen as a vector of power, as a tool of powerholders, and/or as a
product of power relations. These vectors intersect, interact, and
overlap. In any interpersonal relationship, the vectors may
change in strength and direction over time. Part III of this Article concludes with a discussion of the limitations and qualifications inherent in this and in any other model of a human
experience such as power.
20. As reflected in my choice of the word "her" here, this Article uses traditionally female pronouns where gender is wholly neutral. However, in several instances, I
use male pronouns where gender is ostensibly neutral because such choice is relevant to
my analysis, such as in my discussion of the gender of those who commit sexual harassment. Those who commit sexual harassment overwhelmingly are male.
This Article uses the term "target" for the person(s) who are subject{s) of power
exploitation, and the term "powerholder" for the person(s) who possess and/or seek to
exploit their power vector(s). My selection and use of this terminology is for convenience sake only and is not intended to communicate that power always (or even usually)
is asserted by a conscious, volitional act or expression.
21. See infra Part III(A){l) for an explanation of why I use the term "vectors" as
opposed to more common legal terms such as "factors" or "elements" or common social psychology terms such as "bases of power" or "influence tactics."
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Part IV of this Article is designed to show how the model
can be used to enrich legal analysis and thinking. I discuss two
apparently unrelated and vastly different areas where power is
significant: (1) the use of power as a doctrinal consideration in
the law of unconscionability, and (2) the power, empowerment,
and disempowerment22 issues with respect to arbitration23 as a
method of dispute resolution. By applying the model in two
such divergent legal constructs, I suggest the potential of this
model to enhance legal thinking in a variety of contexts and
ways.
I selected unconscionability doctrine as an example for two
reasons: (1) Unconscionability is one of the few areas of law
where the explicit analysis of power is a doctrinal requirement;
and (2) the law of unconscionability, although relatively new, is
well-developed and has been the subject of considerable scholarly commentary. 24 I selected arbitration for inclusion in this
Part because there is no explicit doctrinal recognition of the
power issues in arbitration, and it seems unlikely that power ever
will be a major consideration in arbitration doctrine. Instead,
power and empowerment are significant to our analysis of arbitration because they are standards by which the efficacy of arbitration as a means of dispute resolution can be assessed.
Moreover, almost nothing has been written about power and
empowerment as they relate specifically to arbitration. 25 This
Part of the Article is intended to augment the assessment of the
efficacy of arbitration as a means of dispute resolution by raising

22. By the term "empowerment," I mean the conferring of power as that term is
used in this Article. By the term "disempowerment," I mean the divesting, in whole or
in part, of power.
23. This Article uses the term "arbitration" to refer to any court adjudication-like
procedure that occurs outside the formal court system in which a person or an arbitration panel has the power to make a final, binding decision subject only to limited court
review (for overt bias, fraud, etc.).
24. See, e.g., M.P. Ellinghaus, In Defense of Unconscionability, 78 YALE L.J. 757
(1969); Robert A. Hillman, Debunking Some Myths About Unconscionability: A New
Framework for U.C.C. Section 2-302, 67 CoRNELL L. REv. 1 (1981); John E. Murray,
Jr., Unconscionability: Unconscionability, 31 U. PnT. L. REv. 1 (1969).
25. Scholars who have written about power in connection with Alternative Dispute Resolution ("ADR") either have lumped all forms of ADR together in an overarching analysis of the power issues of ADR or have addressed power as a
consideration in evaluating or conducting one particular form of ADR-mediation. See
infra notes 348-361 and accompanying text.
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and applying empowerment as a standard by which arbitration
can be critiqued.
Three themes emerge from these efforts: (1) Interpersonal
power matters because it is so pervasive that it mediates our experience with the world; (2) if we decide to consider power in
any way, a complex, multidimensional vector model of power is
a useful tool with which to begin; and (3) we can enrich and improve our consideration of the power issues raised by individual
legal doctrines and by the legal system as a whole by viewing
power in such a way.
II.

THE IMPORTANCE oF PowER

Power is an important construct because: (1) Power pervasively intersects with the law; (2) power maintains social control,
aside from power's intersection with the law; and (3) power has
significant interpersonal meaning and effects-power is perceived as a basic human need, and the abuse of power is perceived to harm both the powerholder and her target(s). Power,
therefore, is a core human institution, commanding the attention
of legal scholars, philosophers, and psychologists because of its
influence on all human relations.
A.

The Intersection of Power and the Law

Power issues permeate the law. First, the consideration of
power and power relationships is an explicit doctrinal principle
in some areas of the law. Second, in those doctrinal areas in
which power is not explicitly considered, the failure to consider
power often is either an exercise of or, at least, a reflection of
power issues. Third, law is a means by which power is maintained; expressions of law in cases, statutes, and regulations are
both expressions of power and discourses about power. Fourth,
power is a standard by which the legal system can be measured.
In short, power and law intersect, overlap, and interact; law cannot be considered without also considering power.
1.

Power as a Specific Consideration in Contemporary Legal
Doctrine

Power is explicitly considered an issue in several contexts.
Explicit analysis of power issues can be seen in contract doctrines such as unconscionability, undue influence, and duress; in
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tort emotional distress doctrine; and in equality-related issues
such as sexual harassment and antidiscrimination law.

a.

Power in Contract Doctrine

Traditionally, grossly unfair contractual bargains loosely
were policed through a forced and somewhat disguised focus on
"contract defenses" 26 or through the refusal of courts of equity
to specifically enforce unfair bargainsP Now, most jurisdictions
recognize that if an imbalance in the parties' relative interpersonal power ("gross inequality of bargaining power") results in
an unreasonably one-sided bargain, enforcement of the contract
should be denied or curtailed. 28 Thus, power is given explicit
status as a consideration in the courts' assessment of contracting
parties' requests for relief.29
Similarly, the doctrines of undue influence and duress have
been expanded to reflect a recognition that power operates in
human relations in complex and unseen ways. Duress, for example, once applied only where a party used or threatened to use
actual force or imprisonment to obtain contractual assent. 30 In
the past century, the doctrine of duress has been expanded to
include other forms of coercion, particularly economic coercion.31 Accordingly, duress has been found where a person who
· was not a party to a transaction obtained a lien right from the
contracting parties by exploiting the contracting parties' need to
close the transaction,32 and where one party to a contract exploited the other's desperate and immediate need for performance to negotiate a new and more favorable bargain. 33 Thus, as
26. See generally Arthur A. Leff, Unconscionability and the Code-The Emperor's
New Clause, 115 U. PA. L. REv. 485, 487 (1967).
27. See REsTATEMENT OF CoNTRAcrs § 367 (1932). See, e.g., Miller v. Coffeen,
280 S.W.2d 100 (Mo. 1955) (denying specific performance because contract consideration was inadequate).
28. U.C.C. § 2-302 (1995); RESTATEMENT (SECOND} OF CoNTRAcrs § 208 (1981}.
29. Leff, supra note 26, at 537-41. See also Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture
Co., 350 F.2d 445, 449-50 (D.C. Cir. 1965).
30. JOHN D. CALAMARI & JosEPH M. PERILLO, THE LAw oF CoNTRAcrs § 9-2, at
336-37 (3d ed. 1987).
31. /d. § 9-6, at 346-47.
32. Fizzell v. Meeker, 339 F. Supp. 624 (W.O. Mo. 1970).
33. Alaska Packers' Ass'n v. Domenico, 117 F. 99, 102-03 (9th Cir. 1902) (rescission of contract price increase granted where fish packers refused to pack fish when
packing company could not find replacement packers in time to avoid spoilage of its
fish); Capps v. Georgia Pac. Corp., 253 Or. 248, 453 P.2d 935 (1969) (exploitation of the
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Clare Dalton asserts, the real concern of duress is abuse of
power. 34 The rise of the doctrine of economic duress is simply a
recognition that power may be abused (i.e., coercion may occur)
without resort to force or threats of force.
Undue influence doctrine has undergone a similar expansion. Traditionally, a finding of undue influence required showing that the parties were in a confidential relationship. 35
Recently, however, undue influence has been found where one
party exploited another party's "weakness of spirit," caused by
physical exhaustion and emotional turmoil, through the use of
excessive pressure tactics, such as negotiating the contract in an
inappropriate setting and insisting that the other party decide
immediately without consulting an advisor. 36 This expansion
reveals the concern addressed by the doctrine of undue influence
is exploitation and/or dominance (i.e., power). Undue influence
occurs when one party exploits the weakness of another party
(produced either by the natural relaxation of vigilance when
dealing with a person one trusts or by one's traumatic experiences or fragile psyche) to the first party's gain.
b.

Power in Emotional Distress Doctrine

Courts addressing tort claims of intentional infliction of
emotional distress also explicitly consider power. According to
Prosser and Keeton, the extreme and outrageous conduct element of the emotional distress tort may be met "not so much
from what is done as from abuse by the defendant of some relation or position which gives the defendant actual or apparent
power to damage plaintiff's interests.'' 37 Thus, the outrageous
conduct standard has been met in cases involving abuses of
power by a school that bullied a young girl into confessing to acts
plaintiff's desperate need for cash to obtain assent to a payment of only 3% of total
amount acknowledged by the defendant justified rescission).
34. Clare Dalton, An Essay in the Deconstruction of Contract Doctrine, 94 YALE
L.J. 997, 1024 (1985) (arguing that duress and unconscionability involve an attempt,
through the exercise of state power, "to prevent one contracting party from exercising
illegitimate power over the other").
35. See CALAMARI & PERILLO, supra note 30, § 9-11, at 354 (noting that nearly all
twentieth-century undue influence cases have involved a confidential relationship).
36. Odorizzi v. Bloomfield Sch. Dist., 246 Cal. App. 2d 123, 54 Cal. Rptr. 533
(1966).
37. KEETON ET AL., supra note 2, at 61.
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she had not committed; 38 by a landlord who embarrassed and
humiliated a tenant by a wrongful, racially discriminatory eviction;39 by an association that threatened violence against a business owner and damage to his truck; 40 and in a number of cases
involving collection agencies using threats of arrest or telephone
calls around the clock, and involving neighbors, employers, and
relatives in the collection effort. 41 In all of these cases, the defendant's abuse of power and the plaintiff's consequent loss of
power and/or status met the tort requirement. 42

c.

Power in Antidiscrimination Law

Discrimination doctrine long has been premised on a certain
view of power. 43 Under this view, courts assume that white persons traditionally have held power (from knowledge, wealth,
and/or birth) and that the state should exercise its power to
equalize power by conferring "equal treatment" on nonwhite
persons. 44 The most recent doctrine in this area appears to reflect a perception that antidiscrimination law has vested too
much power in persons who are members of traditionally disenfranchised groups at the expense of those who traditionally possess the power in this society. 45
38. Johnson v. Sampson, 208 N.W. 814 (Minn. 1926).
39. Shaw v. Cassar, 558 F. Supp. 303 (E.D. Mich. 1983).
40. State Rubbish Collectors Ass'n v. Siliznoff, 38 Cal. 2d 330,240 P.2d 282 (1952).
41. KEETON ET AL., supra note 2, at 61-62.
42. For an analysis of the power vectors of the landlord-tenant relationship and an
argument that the power imbalance in that relationship warrants application of the
foregoing line of emotional distress principles, see Susan Keller, Does the Roof Have to
Cave In?: The Landlord/Tenant Power Relationship and the Intentional Infliction of
Emotional Distress, 9 CARDOZO L. REv. 1663 (1988).
43. See generally Neil Gotanda, A Critique of "Our Constitution is Colorblind," 44
STAN. L. REv. 1 (1991) (criticizing the notion that color-blind constitutionalism is a
meaningful decision-making standard).
44. See, e.g., Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954) (suggesting that
inferior education may fail to empower a child by preventing her from (1) succeeding in
life, (2) adjusting to her environment, and (3) preparing for a profession); Griggs v.
Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 429-30 (1971) (finding that Title VII's purpose is "to
achieve equality of employment opportunities and remove barriers that have operated ... to favor ... white employees .... "). See also CATHERINE A. MAcKINNON,
TOWARD A FEMINIST THEORY OF THE STATE 216-34 (1989) (arguing that the fOCUS Of
sex discrimination doctrine-that equality means treating likes alike and unlikes unlike-reinforces and recapitulates male power because it fails to recognize that male
power already has constructed an unequal reality for women in their dealings with
men).
45. See, e.g., City of Richmond v. J.A. Crosan Co., 488 U.S. 469, 510-11 (1989).
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Until twenty-five years ago, without risk of liability, a man
could use his status to induce sexual favors from women coworkers or, through the use of sexually explicit references or
jokes, could create a workplace atmosphere that inhibited women's ability to work. 46 In Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson, 47
however, the Supreme Court held that such behavior is a form of
sex discrimination even where the male demands no quid pro
quo. 48 Sexual harassment law, particularly hostile workplace
cases following Meritor Savings, reflect an explicit recognition
that men in this society exercise power over women by making
sexual advances, by requesting sexual favors, and by engaging in
other verbal or physical conduct of a sexual nature. 49 Such conduct may cause a woman to feel so disempowered that her workplace becomes intolerable.
2.

The Subtle Power Ramifications of Specific Legal Doctrine

Even when power is not an express doctrinal consideration,
legal disputes and doctrinal debates often concern the distribution of power.
For example, in the recent Supreme Court decision in Miller
v. Johnson, 50 the Court held that the state of Georgia's drawing
of political districts to help assure minority group political representation violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment. 51 As the Court acknowledged, the issue in Miller
implicated minority group members' political power; specifically,
the issue implicated the political power of African-Americans
See also Joel W. Friedman, Redefining Equality, Discrimination, and Affirmative Action
Under Title VII: The Access Principle, 65 TEx. L . REv. 41, 59-69 (1986); U.S. COMM'N
ON CIVIL RIGHTS, TOWARD AN UNDERSTANDING OF STOTTS 56-58 (1985) (indicating
that the commission now applies the "color-blindness" principle, including "colorblind" affirmative action). But see Gotanda, supra note 43, at 2-3.
46. See Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 65 (1986) (noting that the
EEOC first added regulations addressing sexual harassment in 1980). See also Jill L.
Goodman, Sexual Harassment: Some Observations on the Distance Traveled and the
Distance Yet to Go, 10 CAP. U. L. REv. 445, 445-63 (1981).
47. 477 u.s. 57 (1986).
48. /d. at 65. See also Henson v. City of Dundee, 682 F.2d 897 (11th Cir. 1982).
49. Goodman, supra note 46, at 456-57 (noting that sexual harassment is degrading to women and that victims of sexual harassment experience depression and other
physical and emotional symptoms and can lose their ability to work effectively).
50. 115 S. Ct. 2475 (1995).
51. /d. at 2490-91.
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living in Georgia. 52 The Court, however, held that redistricting
must be based on "race-neutral considerations." 53 The result,
therefore, reflects a conclusion that the potential for maximizing
political empowerment of African-Americans in Georgia is not
sufficiently compelling to justify Georgia's redistricting plan. 54
Modem labor law can be seen as an attempt to balance the
employer's desire for absolute power over the work force and
the employees' desire to curtail such power through unionization
and doctrinal protection against employer abuses (e.g., race, sex,
and age discrimination). 55 Decisions for employers or employees tend to expand or contract the parties' relative power in an
inverse relationship. 56
Recent recognition of "battered women's syndrome" as a
defense for criminal behavior57 also marks recognition of interpersonal power as an important legal construct in two ways.
First, the "battered women's syndrome" theory explains, in
power and disempowerment terms, why a battered woman may
stay with a battering spouse despite the abuse; she stays because
the physical abuse has degraded her self-esteem and her sense of
self-empowerment. 58 Second, the idea that a homicide may be
justified,59 or a murder sentence reduced,60 because the battered
woman feared her mate so much that she felt the only way to
52. /d. at 2492-93 (criticizing the Department of Justice for its "maximization policy," a policy by which the Department of Justice refused to approve redistricting plans
that failed to maximize minority-controlled voting districts).
53. /d. at 2488.
54. See id. at 2491.
55. William R. Corbett, Taking the Employer's Gun and Bargaining About Returning It: A Reply to a "Law, Economics and Negotiations Approach" to Striker Replacement Law, 56 OHIO ST. L.J. 1511, 1520-22 (1995).
56. For examples of this zero-sum game in play, see NLRB v. Washington Aluminum Co., 370 U.S. 9 (1962) (upholding employee's right to protest working conditions);
George A. Hormel & Co. v. NLRB, 962 F.2d 1061 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (suggesting that
employer had the right to terminate employee who supported consumer boycott of employer's product).
57. Joan H. Krause, Of Merciful Justice and Justified Mercy: Commuting the
Sentences of Battered Women Who Kill, 46 FLA. L. REv. 699, 709-13 (1994).
58. !d. at 708.
59. See generally Kansas v. Stewart, 763 P.2d 572 (Kan. 1988); People v.
Humphrey, 13 Cal. 4th 1073, 921 P.2d 1 (1996).
60. See generally United States v. Johnson, 956 F.2d 894 (9th Cir. 1992) (approving
consideration of Battered Women's Syndrome as a valid ground for a discretionary
downward departure from future sentencing guidelines).
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survive was to kill reflects a recognition that lack of empowerment may create a compelling need for self-help.
Critics of the legal system and of legal doctrine often argue
that power is ignored or insufficiently analyzed. Thus, doctrinal
critics of landlord-tenant law61 and divorce and child custody
law,62 for example, criticize the legal system's failure to incorporate power considerations into legal doctrine.
3.

Law and the Legal System as Instruments of and
Discourses About Power

Our system of government (and perhaps all current systems
of government) and our legal system are premised on possession,
exercise, and retention of · power. Laws are enacted by
lawmakers, exercising power conferred on them by law. These
lawmakers are influenced by, among others, those who derive
power because they possess the skill of persuasion (i.e., lobbyists), those who possess wealth and/or status that the lawmakers
value (ie., lobbies), and those who possess knowledge and information that the lawmakers need or desire. The legal system
helps produce control through the use of state force-imprisonment or court-ordered action or inaction (i.e., injunctions). In
this sense, law is "an instrument of power." 63
But law also is a "discourse of power. " 64 Legal discoursethe stories told in cases, statutes, and regulations-is one of the
many means by which power is maintained and reinforced. Allan Hutchinson summarizes this idea as follows:
[L]aw is a special form of worldmaking .... [L]egal stories
gain meaning from selective emphasis of certain features of
our always complex and frequently ambiguous experience .... The legal raconteurs [lawyers, judges in opinions,
legislators] claim an authority and objectivity for their tales
that effectively overwhelms and trivializes other stories about
the social world. 65

In short, law exercises power through discourse, thereby empow61. Keller, supra note 42.
62. See Trina Grillo, The Mediation Alternative: Process Dangers for Women, 100
YALE L.J. 1545, 1561 (1991).
63. Foucault, supra note 9, at 89.
64. Jerry D. Leonard, Foucault: Genealogy, Law, Praxis, 14 LEGAL Sruo. F. 3, 10
(1990).
65. Hutchinson, supra note 10, at 861 (footnotes omitted).
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ering some people at the expense of others. 66
Moreover, although rules of law "are empty in themselves,"
the manipulation of rules of law helps maintain the social order.67 As Leonard explains,
The effect of this discursive machination [i.e. the manipulation of rules of law] is that, just as oppositional forces effectively expose legal illegitimacies to the dangerous extent that
the dominant legal consciousness must acknowledge crisis
and the concomitant necessity of reform(ation) ... , the dominant regime's seemingly innocent interpretation of a new set
of rules or "rights" effectively works to recoup the losses of
the crisis-moments in order to reinscribe but another form of
hegemony. 68
Thus, great societal conflicts-such as the Civil Rights Movement, the Labor Movement, and even small ruptures in legal
thought through the exposure of indeterminacy in the law-are
subjugated through a murky process of encapsulation. On a
case-by-case basis, through an imperfect, zigzag, give-and-take
process, the indeterminacy is controlled. There is, of course, no
monolithic conspiracy to preserve control, but the effect is as if a
secret controlling cabal were in place. Courts establish new law
or reinterpret old law to respond to a problem. This process of
addressing a problem and thereby calming tension has the effect
of entrenching the legal system as it stands. Power is preserved.

4.

Empowerment as a Standard by Which the Legal System
Can Be Measured

Finally, empowerment is a standard by which the legal system can be critiqued. The structure and form of the legal system
can be seen as an exercise in power dynamics. Critics of courtroom adjudication and of alternative dispute resolution regularly
consider power and empowerment as critical issues in evaluating
how we resolve disputes. They argue that courtroom adjudication, through its forms and rituals, disempowers its users. 69 Similarly, others argue that alternative dispute resolution, lacking
66. /d. For a discussion of how court opinions engage in world-making in connection with contract law, see Dalton, supra note 34.
67. Leonard, supra note 64, at 14.
68. ld.
69. See, e.g., Peter Gabel & Paul Harris, Building Power and Breaking Images:
Critical Legal Theory and the Practice of Law, 11 N.Y.U. REv. L. & Soc. CHANGE 369,
375 (1982-83).
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both formal oversight procedures and the behavior modulation
inherent in more formal human interactions, facilitates bias
against disempowered members of society. 70 Taken together,
these commentators suggest that a legal dispute resolution system should empower its users and that a legal system fails when
its users are left with a sense of disillusionment and
disempowerment. 71
B.

Power as a Means of Maintaining Social Control

From the standpoint of society as a whole, power is important because it is a means of maintaining social control. Power
can be seen as "war by other means ... , and [r]elations of subjugation, or more extreme and intense relations of domination
[are] ... none other than the realization ... of a perpetual relationship of force. "72 In other words, the pervasive intrusion of
power into every human interaction maintains social control.
"The role of ... power is ... to reinscribe it[self] in social institutions, in economic inequalities, in language .... " 73 Power, therefore, exists not only as an end in itself, recapitulating itself
throughout all experience and interaction, but also as the means
of its own preservation.
C.

The Interpersonal Meaning and Effects of Power

On an individual level, power is an end in itself, a force for
self-control and for loss of control, and the means of its own selfmaintenance. The motivation for power and the harm that the
exploitation of power causes to both the powerholder and the
power target are matters of concern.
Human beings seek power out of a complex and indeterminate combination of predisposition and socialization, which
Western social psychologists see as a "psychological need. "74
70. See, e.g., Richard Delgado et al., Fairness and Formality: Minimizing the Risk
of Prejudice in Alternative Dispute Resolution, 1985 Wis. L. REv. 1359, 1388-89 (arguing
that the lack of formality in ADR fosters prejudice because the social ideals of fairness
and equality do not check the parties' natural biases); Grillo, supra note 62.
71. See generally Judith Resnick, Tiers, 57 S. CAL. L. REv. 837, 845-59 (1984).
72. Leonard, supra note 64, at 7, quoting Foucault, supra note 9, at 78, 89, 92.
73. Foucault, supra note 9, at 90.
74. Cobb, supra note 8, at 231-32. See also William L. Cook, Interdependence and

the Interpersonal Sense of Control: An Analysis of Family Relationships, 64 J. PERSONALITY & Soc. PsYCHOL. 587, 587 (1993) ("human beings are inherently motivated to
achieve control in their environmental relations.").
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People also seek power to obtain or fulfill needs and desires or
to protect themselves against what they fear. Social psychologists refer to the idea that power is a tool for personal gain as the
"instrumental utility of power." 75 Consequently, power is significant because individuals, groups, and organizations want to
have it and use it.
Power is also significant because it is abused so easily. Social psychologists believe that the possession of superior power
creates a likelihood of abuse of that power. In line with the wellknown syllogism, "Power tends to corrupt, and absolute power
corrupts absolutely," 76 they contend that powerholders cannot
resist exploiting their superior power for personal gain. 77
The social psychology literature also indicates that the possession and use of power potentially can harm both the
powerholder and the power target. Having exploited a weaker
target, the superior powerholder tends to devalue the target,
who is perceived as inferior and weak, mostly because the target
complied with the powerholder's desire. 78 Thereafter, "the target ... is not given full credit for anything he or she does." 79
David Kipnis calls this process of devaluation "the metamorphic
effects of power." 80 In fact, a failure to exercise power, if recognized by the powerholder and the target as such, may have a
metamorphic effect similar to the metamorphic effect caused by
the exercise of power. If an exercise of power increases the
powerholder's power and decreases the target's power, a recognized failure to exercise power should have the opposite effect,
75. Cobb, supra note 8, at 232.

76. Letter from Lord Acton to Bishop Creighton (Apr. 5, 1887), in EssAYS
FREEDOM AND POWER

ON

329, 335 (1972).

77. See Bertram Raven, The Bases of Power: Origins and Recent Developments,
49 J. Soc. IssUEs No.4, 227, 241-42 (1993). The idea that humans cannot resist exploit-

ing their superior power raises the question of whether there is a distinction between
the use of power and the abuse or exploitation of power. On one hand, I believe that
any use of power to benefit the powerholder is an abuse if the powerholder obtains her
will at the expense of the target's will. However, on the other hand, my experience as a
parent of small children has convinced me (or I have come to rationalize) that power
can be used benevolently. If I gave my daughter a "time out" for hitting her baby sister
or running out into the street, I would not feel that the use of my power was an abuse of
power. I also concede the possibility of beneficent uses of power outside the parenting
context.
78. !d.
79. Kipnis, supra note 5, at 200-01.
80. /d. at 200.
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decreasing the powerholder's power and increasing the target's
power.
The target of a power assertion, in tum, is likely to develop
a sense of learned helplessness. 81 "Learned helplessness occurs
when organisms learn that their responses are independent of
desired outcomes and consequently manifest behavioral deficits."82 In other words, if a person discovers she is subject to
forces outside her control (such as the will of someone more
powerful), she devalues herself,83 thereby losing self-esteem. 84
This sense of helplessness tends to result in depression. 85
There also is evidence that a victim of power exploitation is
more likely to exploit power over others of even less power. The
notion of dominance hierarchies, made famous by the analogy
suggested in Schjelderup-Ebbe's visceral "pecking order" analysis of relationships among chickens,86 suggests that power exploitation begets more exploitation. Thus, a victim of a power
exploitation may be more likely to exploit persons who possess
even less power.
III. A

A.

MoDEL oF INTERPERSONAL PowER

Sources for the Model

Explained and described below is a detailed model of interpersonal power. The model relies on several different sources
from the social psychological, the philosophical, and the legal
fields. In this sense, the model is a synthesis and reorganization
of the works of others. The idea that power derives from a
number of bases, rather than from a unitary source, stems first
from the works of Bertram Raven. Raven's lifetime of work re81. Lyn Y. Abramson et al., Learned Helplessness in Humans: Critique and Refor·
mation, 87 J. ABNORMAL PsYCHOL. 49, 50 (1978).
82. Frank D. Fincham & Kathleen M. Cain, Learned Helplessness in Humans: A
Developmental Analysis, 6 DEVELOPMENTAL REv. 301, 301 (1986).
83. /d. at 304.
84. Abramson et al., supra note 81, at 50. This idea is really just the ftip-side of
Kipnis' description of the effect on the powerholder; the powerholder and the target
both devalue the target after the power exercise.
85. Cook, supra note 74, at 587.
86. Thorleif Schjelderup-Ebbe, Beitrllge zur Sozialpsychologie des Haushuhns,
ZEITSCHRIFT FOR PSYCHOLOGIE 88, 225-52 (1922). Schjelderup-Ebbe notes that, in a
chicken coop, if the strongest chicken in the coop pecks another chicken, the other
chicken will respond by pecking an even weaker chicken.
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garding interpersonal power87 began with the suggestion that
power has six bases: (1) information, (2) reference, (3) expertise, (4) legitimacy, (5) reward, and (6) coercion. 88 These six bases are discussed and form a part of the model described below.
In fact, virtually all subsequent interpersonal power theorists
and researchers have cited Raven's work and defined their ideas
about power in reference to Raven's model, seeking to test his
model,89 criticize it,90 or simply supplement it. 91
The model described below is the product of a hybrid position on Raven's model. On the one hand, my model falls in the
supplementation category because it adopts many of the bases of
power that Raven first suggested; yet, my model also expands
the scope of Raven's categories and suggests additional categories of power. I am also a critic of Raven in the following respects: (1) I use the term "social custom power" instead of
Raven's "legitimate power" term because the notion of legitimacy is socially constructed; (2) because Raven's model inadequately addresses the power that derives from being white, male,
heterosexual, able-bodied, Christian, etc., I treat such power as a
separate power category ("enfranchisement power"); (3) I use
the term "vectors of power" rather than Raven's "bases of
power" term for reasons explained below; and (4) I find that
Raven's omission of discourse power as a vector of power is a
crucial omission because discourse is one of the most pervasive
ways in which power is possessed and exercised.
87. John R.P. French, Jr. & Bertram Raven, The Bases of Social Power in STUDIES
IN SociAL PowER 150 (Dorwin Cartwright ed., 1959); Raven & Kruglanski, supra note
16; Bertram H. Raven, A Power/Interaction Model of Interpersonal Influence: French
and Raven Thirty Years Later, 7 J. Soc. BEHAV. & PERsONALITY 217 (1992).
88. French & Raven, supra note 87, at 232-36.
89. See, e.g., John P. Garrison & Larry E. Bate, Toward Development and Measurement of the Interpersonal Power Construct, 97 J. PsvcHOL. 95 (1977); Virginia P.
Richmond et al., Power Strategies in Organizations: Communication Techniques and
Messages, 11 HuM. CoMM. REs. 85 (1984).
90. See, e.g., Kipnis, supra note 5, at 182-84 (describing the Raven model as
"armchair speculations" and arguing that self-report of influence techniques is a superior methodology for determining bases of power). Kipnis' criticisms of Raven in this
regard seem superficial; he criticizes Raven because people do not self-report the use of
all Raven power bases. Id. at 183-84. However, as I have shown above, power is exercised automatically and often stealthily; the volitional model of power exercise applies
to only a very limited number of power categories.
91. See, e.g., John H. Wade, Forms of Power in Family Mediation and Negotiation,
1994 AusTL. J. FAM. L. 40 (adopting in large part the Raven model (although not by
name) but suggesting additional bases of power).
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The "Vector" Idea

I use the term "vector," as opposed to words more commonly used in the fields of law ("factor" or "element") or social
psychology ("basis" or "influence tactics"). My preference for
the term "vector" stems from its definitional strengths and from
defects in the connotations of other words I might have chosen.
The word "vector" is defined as: "[A] quantity that has
magnitude and direction and that is commonly represented by a
directed line segment whose length represents the magnitude
and whose orientation in space represents the direction."92 The
vector idea, therefore, simultaneously connotes a concept that
has relative weight (magnitude) and bearing (direction). I believe that the categories of power require a concept that can
have both magnitude and direction; I do not believe that power
interactions involve unilateral imposition of power by one party
on another or that all types of power are of equal weight in an
absolute or relative sense.
Rather, all parties to an interaction may and often do possess any number of sources of power. Each source of power has
weight relative to all other sources of power in a power interaction, and power can move in favor of or against a party. 93 Unlike
"vector," legal terms such as "factor" and "element" lack the
quality of direction. Such terms may constrict the use of my proposed model to only doctrinal use. I suggest that the model can
facilitate our assessment of the legal system and its forms. The
common social science terminology, "bases of power" and "influence tactics," is no more availing; both terms fail to communicate the weight and direction ideas.

2.

The Vectors of Power

I perceive eleven vectors of power: (a) force, (b) enfranchisement, (c) social customs, (d) compact, (e) information,
(f) expertise, (g) reference, (h) perceived trustworthiness, (i)
personal qualities, G) manipulation, and (k) discourse.
92. WEBSTER's NEw COLLEGIATE DicnONARY 1296 (G & C Merriam Co. ed., 2d
ed. 1977).
93. For a practical application of these points in the contexts of unconscionability
doctrine and arbitration process, see infra notes 175-395 and accompanying text.
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Force Power

The most elemental form of power is force. Force power
derives from the threat or use of pain, restraint, or encapsulation
so that compliance with the powerholder's intentions occurs
without the target's volition. 94 All power interactions between
an individual and her government involve an implied use of force
power. The government, through deployment of the military
throughout the world, impliedly threatens the use of force power
to maintain domestic and international stability. Criminal law
(through police, judges, and attorneys) also serves as a system of
force power, incarcerating people who do not comply with the
government's rules of behavior. Civil law also involves force
power, both threatened and actual. Courts enforce injunctions
and orders of specific performance, and, through the use of contempt power, sanction disobedience by fine or imprisonment. In
one-on-one interactions, force (pain or encapsulation) can be
used to secure the powerholder's objectives. For example, a
physically abusive husband asserts and maintains power over his
target, his wife, by using force power. 95
b.

Enfranchisement Power

Although a state may be established through force power,
power is sustained through a sometimes subtle, sometimes violent enfranchisement of power in persons, institutions, and
groups. 96 Enfranchisement, therefore, occurs on many different
and complex fronts and is a crucial vector of power. 97
In fact, those who possess enfranchisement power may use
all of the power vectors described below to reinforce their
power. Thus, the social customs that confer power can be seen
as the social customs of those with enfranchisement power. The
resources that enable someone to promise or threaten (compact
94. See Raven, supra note 77, at 236.
95. See Hughes, supra note 2, at 575 (using the tenn "physical power" as a substitute for force).
96. See Leonard, supra note 64, at 7. See also Winter, supra note 17, at 829-32
(noting that power can be imposed through such disparate acts as committing violence
and giving affection).
97. See generally LYNDA M. SAGESTRANO, 16 PsYCHOL. OF WoMEN Q. 439 (1992)
(arguing that women use weaker power strategies, even when stronger strategies are
available to them, because their status as women automatically places them in a position of less power).
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power) are held mostly by those with enfranchisement power.
Likewise, those powerholders have influenced the construction
of our notion of what constitutes information and expertise.
Reference power, perceived trustworthiness power, personal qualities power, and manipulation power are also socially constructed. Our socialization creates our perception of what we
deem trustworthy, of the personal qualities that confer power,
and of what works as a manipulation. 98 Most importantly, enfranchisement power is manifested, established, and reinforced
through the exercise of discourse power. 99
In general, in the United States, being white, male, heterosexual, upper class,10° Christian, able-bodied, English-speaking
(particularly native English-speaking), and of European descent
confers power. 101 Those who possess all of the foregoing characteristics can be characterized as totally enfranchised; such persons possess the greatest power. A person who does not possess
all of the foregoing qualities risks discrimination, a particularly
conspicuous assertion of power by a powerholder against a target. Thus, nonwhite, female, homosexual, lower-class, nonChristian, disabled, non-English speaking, and non-European
persons all have been subjected and continue to be subjected to
discrimination.
Of course, most Americans possess some, but not all, enfranchisement characteristics. Possession of some, but not all, of
the attributes of enfranchisement confers some power or, more
precisely, causes disempowerment to the extent the person lacks
an enfranchisement characteristic. In other words, as Kimberle
Crenshaw argues, those who fall within an intersection of multiple categories of disenfranchisement tend to possess even less
98. Because enfranchisement power works on a fairly subtle level in shaping the
other vectors of power, their separate consideration is warranted. We may not perceive
the operation of enfranchisement power when a businessman sets the agenda for a meeting, but we can recognize that activity as an exercise of status social custom power,
information power, and/or discourse power.
99. See infra notes 162-168 and accompanying text.
100. By the term "class," I do not mean class as that term is used in Western
European countries. Rather, I mean the idea of class both from control over the means
of production and from education, income, and occupation. Duncan Kennedy suggests
that both ideas of class are economic, a conclusion with which I mostly agree. See
Duncan Kennedy, Radical Intellectuals in American Politics, or My Talk at the Gramsci
Institute, in SEXY DRESSING, ETc. 1, 12 (1993).
101. See James T. Tedeschi et al., The Exercise of Power and Influence, in THE
SociAL INFLUENCE PROCESSES, supra note 4, at 287, 302.
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power. 102 Thus, white women and African-American men, who
otherwise possess all of the other enfranchisement characteristics, tend to have more power than similar African-American
women. 103

c.

Social Custom Power

Social custom confers power through the target's own value
system; 104 a powerholder holds social custom power over a target
to the extent that society as a whole and the target in particular
perceive the powerholder's social customs as meritorious. 105 Social custom power operates through a set of symbols, myths, documents, slogans, and legends for its asserted legitimacy. 106
For example, the President of the United States has power
because of symbols (the flag, the Presidential Seal), a myth (the
President represents all of the people), a "document" (the Constitution), a slogan (the United States President is "the leader of
the free world"), and many legends (Washington crossed the
Delaware, Lincoln freed the slaves, and Franklin D. Roosevelt
made the world safe for democracy). Similarly, a wealthy person
has power because of myths (wealth is accumulated based on
merit, and anyone with a good idea can get rich), documents
(deeds, stock certificates, etc. that confer control of land and
business enterprises), slogans ("free enterprise," "freedom of
contract," etc.), and legends (the Horatio Alger legend). Such
symbols, myths, documents, slogans, and legends become so internalized that they become part of each member of society, producing "an inclination to conformity." 107
Of course, these operations of social custom power also are
effective because of the implicit threat of force behind them.
The State threatens to and does apply force to support these
myths, documents, etc. This implied threat can be seen in the
United States' use of military force in international arenas, the
use of police force under our criminal law system, and the use of
102. Kimberle Crenshaw, Demarginalizing the Intersection of Race and Sex: A
Black Feminist Critique of Antidiscrimination Doctrine, Feminist Theory and Antiracist
Politics, 1989 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 139, 148-49.
103. /d.
104. Tedeschi & Bonoma, supra note 4, at 37-38.
105. BARNES, supra note 6, at 24.
106. Tedeschi & Bonoma, supra note 4, at 38.
107. BARNES, supra note 6, at 24-26.
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force to enforce private agreements (specific performance) and
private rights (injunctions).
Social custom power can be categorized into three sub-vectors: (i) status power, (ii) personal associations power, and (iii)
power from social norms, traditions, and values, 108 each of which
is described and explained below.
(i) Status Social Custom Power

There is overwhelming consensus that status confers
power. 109 Status power has been loosely defined as "the degree
of deference which others believe a person should receive by virtue of his role position." 110 This perceived legitimacy based on
office or socially prescribed role led Raven to term this form of
power "legitimate power." 111 Because the issue is one of perceived rather than actual legitimacy, the term "status power"
more appropriately describes this power vector.
A wide variety of statuses can confer status power. First, as
explained above, power exists through enfranchisement. 112 A
second and related form of status power-age-confers power
within narrow parameters. A person in her thirties, forties, or
fifties has greater power than an otherwise identical person in
her twenties; in our society, however, a person in her seventies
or eighties has less power than most other adults.U 3
Third, formal authority confers status power. A position, office, or title confers power almost automatically. 114 Thus, elected
108. Of course, social norms, values, and traditions explain all of the social custom
vectors; they are separated here to illustrate that social norms, values, and traditions
confer power even when they do not confer status.
109. Jack M. Weatherford, Language in Political Anthropology, in PowER
THROUGH DiscouRsE 11, 15 (Leah Kedar ed. 1987); Tedeschi & Bonoma, supra note 4,
at 7.
110. Tedeschi et al., supra note 101, at 302.
111. Raven, supra note 77, at 233.
112. Enfranchisement is treated as a separate power vector because of its pervasiveness and importance.
113. But see ERDMAN PALMORE, THE HoNORABLE ELDERS: A CRoss-CuLTURAL ANALYSIS OF AGING IN JAPAN 127 (1975) (noting that Japanese elders retain
much more status than do their Western counterparts).
114. See Tedeschi et al., supra note 101, at 302; NIKOLAS RosE, GoVERNING THE
SouL: THE SHAPING OF THE PRIVATE SELF ix (1990); Weatherford, supra note 109, at
15; Wade, supra note 91, at 46.
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officials, CEOs, parents, and school principals possess power. 115
In fact, any supervisory position confers power, as does
seniority. 116
Fourth, control over resources valued by society (money,
materials, labor, or other goods or services), which has been
called "wealth" 117 or resource power, 118 also confers status
power. 119 In fact, Tedeschi et al. argue that all status power stems
from control over rewarding and punishing through resource allocation.120 I believe that status power also derives from, among
other things, social norms and values; nevertheless, resource
power clearly is a particularly formidable source of status power.
Ross Perot's power and the power of families such as the Forbes,
the Rockefellers, and the Kennedys can be attributed, at least in
part, to their control of resources.
Prestige is also a form of status power, although it is closely
linked to formal authority and resource power. Prestige can be
seen as perceived power. Although prestige may be loosely connected to the powerholder's actual quantity of disposable influence resources, 121 it depends mostly on the target's perceptions
(and the perceptions of society as a whole, which mediate the
target's perceptions) for its weight.
(ii) Personal Associations Social Custom Power

Power from personal associations is a derivative form of social custom power; the powerholder's power originates in another person who already possesses power. Personal association
power can derive from lineage, which derives from one's familial
background. 122 Families with generations of. political powersuch as the Kennedys, the Gores, the Roosevelts, and the Rockefellers-exemplify this form of power; however, such power is
not limited to famous people in society. This form of power is
evident in the policies of social clubs and fraternities that give
115. See Tedeschi et al., supra note 101, at 302; RosE, supra note 114, at ix; Weatherford, supra note 109, at 15; Wade, supra note 91, at 46.
116. See Tedeschi et al., supra note 101, at 302.
117. See S. Jack Odell, The Powers of Language: A Philosophical Analysis, in
POWER THROUGH DISCOURSE, supra note 109, at 19, 20.
118. See Thdeschi et al., supra note 101, at 302.
119. /d.
120. /d.
121. /d. at 306.
122. See id. at 303; O'Dell, supra note 117, at 20.
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preferential consideration to the offspring of former members, in
workplace environments, and in some schools' and colleges' admissions policies.
Other personal associations also confer power, as long as
the association is with a person or people who possess power. 123
The addition to our speech of the phrase "Friends of Bill" (or
"F.O.B.") and the cache that attaches to those who fall into this
group evidences the prevalence and wide acceptance of this form
of power. 124
(iii) Social Norms, Traditions, and Values Social Custom Power
Social custom power also derives from oughtness, 125 social
values and norms, and traditions. Oughtness engenders compliance by activating personal and/or social commitments; it comes
from the target's inclinations to help others or to conform to
normative values regarding human interactions. 126 Oughtness
takes three forms. First, reciprocity-the idea that relationships
should be fair and equal-confers power. 127 Thus, a friend can
compel her friend to return a favor. Second, equity-the idea
that life should be fair-confers power.l28 Efforts to remedy
past discrimination or to atone for past wrongdoing are examples of this form of power. Third, responsibility or dependence-the human inclination to help those in need-confers
some power. 129 Beggars, addicts, and victims of abuse possess
this power.
Although oughtness may confer some power, the power
conferred is weak and obscure. Unlike other forms of power,
the use of oughtness does not necessarily confer greater power
on the powerholder and, in fact, may diminish the power of the
oughtness powerholder. 130 This odd effect occurs because com123. Wade, supra note 91, at 45.
124. Of course, such power waxes and wanes as the original powerholder's power
waxes and wanes. Thus, we would expect that the power of F.O.B.s fluctuated in rough
accord with the fluctuations in President Clinton's re-election prospects.
125. Tedeschi & Bonoma, supra note 4, at 9-12.
126. /d. See also Raven, supra note 77, at 234-35.
127. Raven, supra note 77, at 234-35.
128. /d.
129. !d.

130. As I argue above, an exercise of power usually enhances the power of the
powerholder because it causes both the powerholder and the target to devalue the target. See supra notes 78-85 and accompanying text.
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pliance with oughtness can be perceived by both parties as the
product of the target's benevolence, rather than as a product of
the powerholder's exercise of power. The underlying message
when a target complies with an oughtness power seems to be: "I
will comply with your request this time; but, remember, my compliance is not caused by you; it is caused by my kindness." At
the very least, exercise of oughtness power may teach the
powerholder that she is virtually powerless in all or most other
respects.131
Indeed, the target's actions may be designed consciously or
unconsciously to preserve the target's power in the long run by
temporarily appeasing the powerholder and encouraging the
powerholder to return to a state of quiescence. 132 Peter Gabel
calls this process "pseudo-recognition. " 133
Social norms and values also may confer power. 134 Numerous examples of this form of power exist. The social norms and
values regarding women in the work force has resulted in women
earning less money than men for performing equal work. Democracy has proven to be a very effective power source for the
state-so effective, in fact, that young men and women have died
willingly in combat believing they were fighting to preserve democracy. Some social values may confer power on those who
otherwise might lack it. For example, the social value that our
society places on free expression has conferred some power on
disenfranchised people expressing unpopular views. 135 As Gabel
and Harris point out, however, "the appeal to rights" also can
reinforce powerlessness because it "inherently affirms that the
source of social power resides in the State rather than in the people themselves. " 136
Tradition power, also known as "habitual power," is the
"power of the status quo that rests on the premise that it is normally easier to maintain a particular arrangement or course of
131. The diminution in power caused by the exercise of oughtness power helps
explain the disinclination of many people to accept favors, special help, or charity.
132. See generally Peter Gabel, The Phenomenology of Rights-Consciousness and
the Pact of the Withdrawn Selves, 62 TEx. L. REv. 1563, 1592-93 (1984).
133. !d. at 1593.
134. Wade, supra note 91, at 45.
135. See, e.g., Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15 (1971) (protecting as speech the
wearing of a jacket bearing the statement, "Fuck the Draft").
136. Gabel & Harris, supra note 69, at 375.
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action than to change it. " 137 It is easier to maintain the status
quo because people tend to fear and, therefore, dislike change.
Thus, in a divorce mediation, tradition power may influence women to undertake primary responsibility for child care. 138 Tradition power also helps to explain the common law's durability and
the legal concept of stare decisis.
d.

Compact Power

Compact power involves an agreement of sorts between the
powerholder and the target. The powerholder asserts power by
promising to add or take away something of value to the target.139 The compact may be impersonal (such as a loss or gain in
salary) or personal (such as approval or disapproval). This
power vector is closely aligned with resource social custom power
because the powerholder requires control over resources to exercise compact power.
(i) Coercive Compact Power

Also known as "sanction power, "140 coercive compact power
derives from threatening to punish. 141 Many employment-related power interactions involve exercises of coercive power,
such as threats to demote, terminate, or cut pay. Similarly, parents exercise coercive power by threatening to take a toy away
from a child or to send a child to her room. A lover who threatens to withhold sexual interactions also exercises coercive power.
(ii) Reward Compact Power

This is the opposite of coercive compact power. It involves
promising a benefit to the target. 142 Promises of raises and promotions to employees, of gifts and special treats to children, of
love to a lover, and of parole to a prison inmate are all examples
of reward compact power.
137.
138.
139.
140.
141.
142.

Wade, supra note 91, at 45.
See id. at 49.
Raven, supra note 77, at 233.
Wade, supra note 91, at 45.
Raven, supra note 77, at 233.
Jd. See also Tedeschi & Bonoma, supra note 4, at 9-12.
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Information (Knowledge) Power

Simply put, knowledge confers power. 143 Specifically, according to Raven, knowledge that has persuasive force confers
power. 144 Information power can be applied directly by expressing the knowledge to the target, or indirectly by giving hints and
making suggestions. 145 In the contract bargaining context, information is a key bargaining tool available to each party to a proposed contract. Knowledge of future development plans of
property being sold and knowledge of plans to discontinue building a particular car model both have the potential to greatly affect value. The principle of caveat emptor, for example,
expresses the courts' inclination to reward those who possess information power. 146 Information also may confer power in the
workplace (knowledge about favored company projects), education (such as knowledge about scholarships and other financial
aid), and in personal relationships (knowledge about a lover's
infidelity).

f.

Expert Power

Expert power arises from possessing great experience,
knowledge, or status regarding _the subject at issue. 147 Consequently, expert power is closely linked to information power. Expert power can be distinguished from information power because
whereas information power derives from communication, expressions, hints, or suggestions of specific information, expert
power derives from the possibility that the powerholder possesses relevant information and from the fact that the other
party knows of that possibility. Thus, deference to expert power
derives from the expert's self-confidence, others' perception of
her expertise, and the demand for her help. 148
Expert power can be acquired in a variety of ways (educa143. Deborah Tanner, Remarks on Discourse and Power, in PowER THROUGH
DrscouRsE, supra note 109, at 3-4; Tedeschi & Bonoma, supra note 4, at 9-12.
144. Raven, supra note 77, at 232.
145. Id. at 235-36.
146. See Anthony T. Kronman, Mistake, Disclosure, Information, and the Law of
Contracts, 7 J. LEGAL Sruo. 1, 15 (1978) (arguing that the law of nondisclosure should
be structured to reward deliberate accumulation of information).
147. Raven, supra note 77, at 233; Wade, supra note 91, at 45.
148. Tedeschi & Bonoma, supra note 4, at 23; Tedeschi et al., supra note 101, at
304.
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tion, training, or experience) and can take a wide variety of
forms (technical, historical, technological, informational, or educational). In fact, the more complicated society becomes, the
greater the power of experts in their chosen field. Fields as diverse as medicine, law, psychology, psychiatry, and electronics
have witnessed the slow erosion of the influence of the general
practitioner. The power of the specialist is growing because it is
slowly becoming impossible for one person to be an expert in all
sub-fields of a particular field.
g.

Reference Power

Reference power is acquired in two ways: (1) the target
cedes power to the powerholder because the target desires the
powerholder's acceptance, or (2) the target wants to be identified with the powerholder or has a sense of already-existing
identification with the powerholder. 149 Tedeschi and Bonoma
call reference power "social contagion" power150 because it derives from the target's desire to model or to imitate the
powerholder. 151 Examples of reference power include older siblings' power over younger siblings, and the power of mentors,
actors, athletes, and popular musicians.
h.

Perceived Trustworthiness Power

Power may come from the powerholder's perceived trustworthiness, particularly the target's perception of the
powerholder's inclination to promote the target's self-interest
rather than the powerholder's self-interest. 152 Clergypersons,
doctors, and psychologists derive power from being perceived as
trustworthy, as do parents, friends, and relatives. Indeed, the
early development of undue influence law involved a fairly explicit recognition that we defer to powerholders when we perceive these powerholders as inclined to protect our interests,
rather than their own.t53
149.
150.
151.
152.
153.

Raven, supra note 77, at 233.
Tedeschi & Sonoma, supra note 4, at 9-12.
/d. at 24-25.
See id. at 23.
See supra notes 35-36 and accompanying text.
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Personal Qualities Power

On a culturally contingent basis, some character traits tend
to confer power. 154 In Western culture, attributes such as selfconfidence, determination, endurance, intelligence, persistence,
memory, calmness, and charisma all tend to confer power because they communicate something to the target about the
powerholder that causes the target to value or to defer to the
powerholder. Self-confidence, calmness, and charisma communicate to the target that the powerholder believes that she should
have power over the target. Determination and persistence
communicate that the powerholder is vested in and believes she
is right about the object of her determination and persistence.
Memory and intelligence become sources of power, much like
expert power, when the powerholder and target believe that the
powerholder's memory is better than the target's memory/ 55
and/or that the powerholder is simply smarter than the target
(and therefore is right about whatever she wants).
As noted previously, there is a connection between those
who possess enfranchisement power and the construction of society's notion of which personal qualities confer power. For example, as Marl Matsuda explains, "accent" is a socially constructed
norm. 156 She points out that:
Everyone has an accent, but when an employer refuses to
hire a person "with an accent," they are referring to a hidden
norm of non-accent-a linguistic impossibility, but a socially
constructed reality. People in power are perceived as speaking normal, unaccented English. Any speech that is different
from that constructed norm is called an accent. 157

It seems equally likely that self-confidence, determination, en-

durance, intelligence, persistence, memory, calmness, and charisma are equally and similarly socially constructed.
j.

Manipulation Power
Manipulation power is exercised secretly and indirectly. 158

154. See Wade, supra note 91, at 45.
155. See id. at 51 (arguing that memory for detail confers power in a divorce
mediation).
156. Mari J. Matsuda, Voices of America: Accent, Antidiscrimination Law, and a
Jurisprudence for the Last Reconstruction, 100 YALE L. REv. 1329, 1361 (1991).
157. !d.
158. See Tedeschi & Bonoma, supra note 4, at 9-12.
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It derives from changing some aspect of the target, maneuvering

the target's environment to inhibit or to facilitate the desired behavior,159 distracting the target,1 60 or causing the target discomfort that falls short of a direct sanction161 (which would be
coercive compact power). Manipulation power therefore occurs
in many different contexts and is difficult to discern. Examples
include subtly nudging a spouse so she will awaken and hear a
baby crying, designing a car so that it cannot start unless the seat
belt is fastened, and pestering and harassing the target until she
gives in to the powerholder's desires.
k.

Discourse Power

Discourse power is one of· the most significant sources of
power. Any exercise of power short of force is a language product.162 In fact, Virginia Richmond and her colleagues argue that
communication may be the most important factor in determining
an individual's power. 163 Information, expertise, compacts, social customs, trustworthiness, and manipulations are imposed as
power vectors on the target or communicated to the target
through the use of speech. Consequently, according to Jack
Weatherford, the person who establishes the initial agenda and
context of an interaction possesses tremendous power. 164 Likewise, control over the procedures by which decisions are made
confers power. 165 Communication skills, such as organization
and clarity, also confer some discourse power. 166 In fact, "the
very act of describing a source of power or perceived power is
(itself) a source of power." 167
The importance of discourse power can be seen only by
more closely examining how and in what contexts it operates.
First, the media exercises tremendous discourse power. Those
who possess power in society, particularly those who possess me159.
160.
161.
91, at 45.
162.
163.

Raven, supra note 77, at 236.
/d. at 237.
This form of power sometimes is called "nuisance power." Wade, supra note

See Weatherford, supra note 109, at 11.
Virginia P. Richmond et al., Power Strategies in Organizations Communication Techniques and Messages, 11 HuM. COMM. REs. 85, 89 (1984).
164. Weatherford, supra note 109, at 15.
165. Wade, supra note 91, at 45.
166. See id. at 51.
167. See id. at 45.
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dia power, define and confine the spectrum of ideas that achieve
society-wide dissemination. If movies and television treat marriage between persons of the opposite sex as "normal," then
marriage between persons of the same sex is marginalized and
made "abnormal." If the model of leadership is almost always
depicted as white and male, even when a nonwhite or woman is
in charge, leadership by nonwhites and women that conflicts
with the white-male model is marginalized.
Patterns of discourse create and reinforce tremendous
power in our society. For example, the discourse in our society
portrays male as the norm and female as different; women are
viewed in reference to men, rather than in reference to women's
experiences in a male-dominated world. 168 The discourse about
sexuality defines and confines homosexuality in a similar way;
the common discourse portrays heterosexuals as normal and
marginalizes homosexuals as "outside" normal sexuality. In law,
judges exercise discourse power through their opinions. The
facts they include and omit, the words they use, and the structure
of their discussions set boundaries on future discussions.
On a more interpersonal level, an employer may exercise
discourse power through a number of subtle yet effective techniques. She can emphasize her discourse power by controlling
the time, location, participants, seating, and agenda for a meeting. Thus, even before the powerholder and the target have met,
they have participated in a discourse about the powerholder's
power over the target.
B.

Limitations on and Complexities in the Model of Power

This model can facilitate our analysis of legal issues, our assessment of doctrine, and our evaluation of our systems of justice. A few important limitations of this model, however, need
to be considered. 169
1.

Reductionist Nature of Modeling

Any model of power is essentially reductionist. The very
process of dividing a construct into vectors and of creating a
model reduces and simplifies. This process forces reality to fit
168. See CATiiERINE A. MACKINNON, FEMINISM UNMODIFIED 22-23, 65 (1987).
169. The limitations described below would apply to any model of a social
construct.
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into the parameters and concepts of the model. Power operates
in such complex and subtle ways that any model is inadequate
when measured against real-world experience.
2.

Inability to Verify Model

There is no way to verify the validity of the model. Raven's
model of power, on which my model relies significantly, has been
the subject of considerable analysis and testing in a wide variety
of relationships (e.g., supervisors and supervisees, parents and
children, husbands and wives, children and other children, teachers and students, doctors and patients, salespersons and customers, franchisors and franchisees, couples in sexual encounters,
and political figures and other political figures)P 0 These studies
conclude that the model works because some researcher can categorize successfully, after the fact, the power assertions of the
parties involved in conformity with Raven's model. 171 Statistical,
after-the-fact assessments are, in this sense, more about the tester's perceptions than about the real-world interaction being
studied. 172
3.

Indeterminacy of Power Classification Process

In creating my power model, I assume, in some respects,
that each power vector is independent and clearly demarcated.
In fact, the lines between the power vectors can be blurred easily. For example, when a parent gives her child a "time out," it
may be difficult to determine if she is exercising formal authority
social custom power, compact power, resource social custom
power, reference power, or a particular combination of the foregoing. Similarly, when a judge jails an attorney for contempt,
her power exercise is an indistinguishable hybrid of formal authority social custom power and force power; but her most effective power source in future dealings may be a combination of her
continuing resource social custom power, formal authority social
custom power, reference power, discourse power, and her prestige
social custom power. A judge's control over her docket is a particularly difficult classification conundrum. It can be a form of
170. Raven, supra note 77, at 233-34.
171. See, e.g., Bertram H. Raven, Political Applications of the Psychology of Interpersonal Influence and Social Power, 11 PoL. PsYCHOL. 493 {1990).
172. See Kipnis, supra note 5, at 182.
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discourse power; however, it can also be part of the judge's formal authority social custom power. Clearly, the line drawing in
particular human interactions will be somewhat artificial. 173
4.

Intersection and Interrelationship of the Vectors of Power

Precisely demarcating the vectors of a power interaction in
any context is difficult, if not impossible. The model suggests
vectors of power, but it does not attempt to grapple with the
many complex, intersecting, and complicated ways in which
power operates in the real world. 174 Therefore, the model is useful as a tool for recognizing the sometimes obscure operations of
power, but the model cannot be used to derive absolute power
values in complex relationships.
In any power interaction, both the powerholder and the target may possess any of the foregoing power vectors. For example, a supervisor may possess formal authority social custom
power over her supervisee, but a supervisee can exercise discourse power by calling a meeting with the supervisor and setting
the agenda. If the supervisee is related to the CEO or possesses
enfranchisement power that the supervisor lacks, the power relationship may be skewed and intersecting; in such a situation, it
may be difficult to determine which party actually possesses
greater power.
Moreover, the power vectors and sub-vectors are not of uniform strength. For example, oughtness social custom power actually may cause the powerhdlder to lose power and is, therefore, a
weaker form of power. On the other hand, the immediacy of
compact power, where the target gets a reward or punishment, is
a stronger form of power in many contexts. Manipulation power
173. Although the line drawing is artificial, it is not meaningless. The point of
developing this model is to enrich the analysis of power interactions and to aid recognition of the operation of power in situations where the operation of power may be difficult to discern. In other words, it really does not matter whether the judge is exercising
discourse power or formal authority when she controls her docket; what matters is that
she is exercising power and that we can recognize her actions as reflecting and manifesting power.
174. See generally Raven & Kruglanski, supra note 16, at 81 (noting that, in the
real world, "a power relationship includes several bases of power" and that "even
greater complexity" is introduced "when there are differing degrees of each power base
operating in a given ... situation"); John P. Garrison & Larry E. Pate, Toward Development and Measurement of the Interpersonal Power Construct, 97 J. PsYCHOL. 95, 99-103
(1977) (finding empirical support for the idea that power is multidimensional).
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and discourse power are more difficult to classify in terms of
strength because they are not always recognized consciously.
The magnitude of a powerholder's particular power vector
is another complexity worth considering. We know a billionaire
possesses more resource social custom power than a person with
a net worth of $100,000; how much more power the billionaire
possesses is less clear. Within any large, hierarchical employment structure, many people possess substantial formal authority
social custom power and can exercise compact power over their
subordinates. Therefore, it is insufficient to note that a person
possesses a power vector; the magnitude of that power vector is
equally important.
IV.

APPLICATION OF THE PowER MoDEL To THE

UNCONSCIONABILITY DOCTRINE AND TO THE
ANALYSIS OF ARBITRATION AS A MEANS
OF DISPUTE RESOLUTION

A.
1.

Unconscionability
Background of the Doctrine

The legal maxim, pacta sunt servanda (agreements must be
observed), communicates the courts' overriding preference to
avoid interfering with contractual bargains. Occasionally, however, some courts have determined that particular contractual
bargains were so one-sided that this principle would work an injustice. For example, courts of equity have denied specific performance on the grounds that "the exchange is grossly
inadequate" 175 and indirectly corrected the unfairness of the bargain "by adverse construction of language, by manipulation of
the rules of offer and acceptance or by determinations that the
clause was contrary to public policy or to the dominant purpose
of the contract." 176
The drafters of the Uniform Commercial Code (UCC)
chose to allow courts to confront directly the perceived bad bargain problem. Section 2-302 (and its descendant, Restatement
175. U.C.C. § 2-302(1) (1995); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 364
(1979) ("specific perfonnance ... will be refused if such relief would be unfair because ... the exchange is grossly inadequate."). See, e.g., Gabrielson v. Hogan, 298 F.
722, 725-26 (8th Cir. 1924) (affinning the denial of specific perfonnance based on lack
of equivalency in a sale of land for one-third more than it was worth).
176. U.C.C. § 2-302 cmt. 1.
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(Second) of Contracts, Section 208) allows courts to assess explicitly the fairness of the bargain as a matter of law. 177 Section
2-302 provides:
If the court as a matter of law finds the contract or any clause

of the contract to have been unconscionable at the time it was
made the court may refuse to enforce the contract, or it may
enforce the remainder of the contract without the unconscionable clause, or it may so limit the application of any unconscionable clause as to avoid any unconscionable result. 178

Neither Section 2-302 nor Section 208 clearly defines the
term "unconscionable." In the seminal law review article for unconscionability doctrine, Unconscionability and the Code: The
Emperor's New Clause, the late Professor Arthur Leff proposed
that a contract should be deemed unconscionable only if the
court finds both "procedural unconscionability" and "substantive unconscionability" present in the transaction. 179
Substantive unconscionability means that the terms of the
contract are unreasonably harsh. 180 Substantive unconscionability, although crucial to a determination of unconscionability, is
pertinent to this Article only to the extent that the contract
terms may have ramifications bearing on the power between the
parties. Particularly unfair terms may evidence a power disparity not apparent from the court's description of the facts or from
the parties' presentation of the evidence. 181 Where the terms are
written in legalese, they also may confer information power on
the party more familiar with legal language. 182 If the contract
includes terms giving one party control over the other, power
may be created or reinforced. Finally, some terms are a discourse about the parties' relative power183 by communicating a
structure for the parties' relationship. 184 Such terms serve a
myth-making function; their presence in the parties' proposed
177. See id.; RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) oF CoNTRACTS§ 208.
178. u.c.c. § 2-302.
179. Leff, supra note 26, at 539.
180. Id. at 539-40.
181. See, e.g., Vockner v. Erickson, 712 P.2d 379, 382-83 n.8 {Alaska 1986) (arguing that the presence of very unfair terms may either negate or at least reduce the
requirement of procedural unconscionability).
182. See, e.g., Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co., 350 F.2d 445, 447 (D.C.
Cir. 1965) (noting that the contract term at issue is virtually incomprehensible yet
enforceable).
183. See supra sub-part III{A){2){k).
184. For a detailed discussion of this point in connection with the surrogate
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agreement may limit the parties' conceptions of the power possibilities within their relationship.
While the terms to a contract may bear on, evidence, create,
or reinforce power, the focus of this Part of the Article is the
procedural unconscionability requirement. Procedural unconscionability, according to Professor Leff, means unfairness in the
bargaining process. 185 Early cases applying Professor Left's procedural unconscionability formulation refined the standard to include "an absence of meaningful choice" 186 and/or a "gross
inequality of bargaining power. "187 This refinement is both an
explicit and an implicit call for an assessment of power. The call
is explicit because a problem with the parties' relative bargaining
power may satisfy the requirement. It is implicit because if one
party has no "meaningful choice" and therefore must acquire
what she needs or wants from the other party, she likely possesses very little bargaining power.
2.

Analytical Perspective

In subpart (3) below, I describe the ideas that courts have
used to grapple with the question of power. This analysis reveals
that most courts analyze the parties' relative power incompletely. I do not contend that all of the cases are wrongly decided or that a gross inequality of bargaining power exists in
every contract. Rather, I contend that the cases are reasoned
poorly because they fail to or deficiently analyze a crucial issue.188 The risk of poor reasoning is the possibility of poor-quality results.
The courts' stories of the parties' relationships do not include all information relevant to an analysis of power. For example, courts rarely mention race, sex, or class,189 thereby
precluding a complete analysis of enfranchisement power. Also,
parenting contract between Mary Beth Whitehead and William and Elizabeth Stern, see
infra notes 342-347 and accompanying text.
185. Leff, supra note 26, at 539.
186. Williams, 350 F.2d at 449. The power implications of Williams, not addressed
by the court because of the procedural posture of the case, are detailed below.
187. /d.
188. It is worth noting that this Article does not purport to address the question of
how much disparity is enough to warrant the conclusion that there was procedural
unconscionability.
189. This omission is not necessarily bad. Identifying race, sex, or class as a source
of power or disempowerment has the potential to reinforce race, sex, and class as
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courts seldom describe the bargaining process with sufficient detail to allow an assessment of the parties' contract formation discourses. Consequently, little or no information exists with which
to assess the discourse-based power vectors. This world making
and world restricting is an exercise of the judges' discourse
power. Thomas Ross notes that "[s]ociety generally accepts the
notion of judges (or lawyers) crafting their version of the 'facts,'
telling the story their way, yet pretending that the events speak
for themselves. " 190 A judicial opinion is, of course, an advocacy
piece. The author of a judicial opinion uses her opinion to argue
the wisdom and legitimacy of the particular result she has
reached. Facts supporting her result are highlighted and described in detail; facts that do not support her result, on the
other hand, are shaded, obscured, minimized, or even omitted.
Moreover, even some facts that support the result may be omitted because the author of the opinion did not consider their relevancy. As a result, the world depicted in judicial opinions lacks
much of the subtlety and complexity of the real world. 191
The foregoing limitations on the judicial process support the
argument that "small doctrinal adjustments ... will prove ineffective because they do not consider the systems of power and
knowledge within which all interpretive acts take place. " 192
Although I concede this difficulty as a general proposition, I
nevertheless retain a reconstructionist aspiration. I perceive the
explicit call for the consideration of power embedded in unconscionability doctrine as an opportunity to begin reconstructing a
legal system cognizant of and responsive to power dynamics.
In subpart (4) below, I suggest how this opportunity may be
exploited. I demonstrate the possibilities for an in-depth analysis of power through application of my power model. I use the
model to analyze the power relationships in two well-known unconscionability cases: In re Baby Ml 93 and Williams v. WalkerThomas Furniture Co. 194 This analysis, although constrained by
sources of power and to discourage totally enfranchised persons from contracting with
persons who lack some characteristic of enfranchisement power.
190. Thomas Ross, The Richmond Narratives, 68 TEx. L. REv. 381, 387 (1989).
191. Thus, Ross concludes, "we have known for some time that opinions are, in
part, stories." /d.
192. See, e.g., Delgado, supra note 10, at 823.
193. 525 A.2d 1128 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1987), affd in part, rev'd in part, 537
A.2d 1227 (N.J. 1988).
194. 350 F.2d 445 (D.C. Cir. 1965).
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the world making of the courts that heard the two cases, reveals
that at least bargaining power sometimes can be analyzed meaningfully within the current doctrinal framework. The model allows consideration and even confrontation of the systems of
power.

3.

The Analysis of Power in Unconscionability Cases

Because unconscionability doctrine requires courts to examine power, courts have been forced to develop and apply
ideas about interpersonal power. Although most recent cases
refer to the general idea of procedural unconscionability, courts'
ideas about power vary greatly. Some courts touch on several of
the ideas suggested above, although incompletely. Other courts
completely ignore power. Still others simplify power so much
that, as a practical matter, power is irrelevant. Even those courts
that have concluded that unequal bargaining power infected the
parties' bargain analyzed the power issues incompletely. I describe and analyze with reference to the power model the doctrinal approaches courts have used in unconscionability cases,
using three categories: the Contract of Adhesion Approach, the
Knowing Assent Approach, and the Multivariable Approach. 195

a.

The Contract of Adhesion Approach

The Contract of Adhesion Approach predates the doctrine
of unconscionability. 196 The advent of unconscionability, however, has not deterred some courts from continuing to rely on
contract of adhesion ideas. 197
The Contract of Adhesion Approach does not require any
explicit assessment of power. Rather, the focus is on whether
the contract can be classified as a "contract of adhesion. " 198
Power, in such cases, is a side issue. Courts applying the Contract of Adhesion Approach hold that a contract is unconscionable only if the party has no alternative to obtain a particular
necessity other than to accept the standard form contract that
195. Some courts have not considered power as an issue. See, e.g., Sherman v.
Lunsford, 44 Wash. App. 858, 723 P.2d 1176 (1986) (no discussion of power even
though the party claiming unconscionability had accepted the contract out of a desperate need to prevent a huge economic loss).
196. See, e.g., Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 161 A.2d 69 (N.J. 1960).
197. See, e.g., In re Estate of Szorek, 551 N.E.2d 697, 700 (Ill. App. Ct. 1990).
198. See, e.g., Milligan v. Big Valley Corp., 754 P.2d 1063, 1067 (Wyo. 1988).
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the other party offers. 199 TYpical examples of such contractors
include public utilities,200 common carriers,201 and hospitals. 202
In traditional political terms, this approach can be seen as more
or less conservative. By restricting relief to only the most obvious and excessive problems (e.g., contracts for necessities between an individual and monopolies), courts reflect a fear of
over-inclusion, a fear that freedom of contract otherwise would
be impaired.
The Contract of Adhesion Approach has been applied in a
wide variety of circumstances. For example, courts have ruled
against consumers when the subject matter of the contract was
not deemed a necessity, so that protection by the law of unconscionability was deemed unnecessary. Milligan v. Big Valley
Corporation 203 is typical. In Milligan, the plaintiff's decedent entered into a contract with a ski resort to participate in a ski
race. 204 The contract contained a "release of claim" that purported to absolve the defendant of all potential liability for any
injury to the decedent. 205 After the decedent died in the race,
the plaintiff sued, alleging that the defendant ski resort's negligence caused the death and the clause was unenforceable as
against public policy. 206
The court rejected the plaintiff's claim and enforced the exculpatory clause. 207 It reasoned that the contract was not unenforceable as a contract of adhesion because (1) the decedent had
a choice not to race, (2) racing is not a necessity, and (3) the
decedent therefore had reasonable alternatives to participating
in the race. 208 The court noted that the contract was presented
on a "take-it-or-leave-it" basis, but held this fact irrelevant. 209
This holding seems to ignore the very issue that the court
199. See, e.g., In re Estate of Szorek, 551 N.E.2d at 700.
200. Albuquerque Tire Co. v. Mountain States Tel. & Tel. Co., 697 P.2d 128, 131
(N.M. 1985).
201. Milligan, 754 P.2d at 1066; Anderson v. Union Pacific R.R., 790 P.2d 438, 441
(Kan. Ct. App. 1990).
202. McRand, Inc. v. Van Beelen, 486 N.E. 2d 1306, 1314 (Ill. App. Ct. 1985).
203. 754 P.2d 1063 (Wyo. 1988).
204. /d. at 1064.
205. /d. at 1064-65.
206. /d.
207. /d. at 1069.
208. /d. at 1067-68.
209. /d. at 1067.
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purports to be analyzing: The ski resort's "take-it-or-leave-it"
statement suggests that the decedent had no other choice but to
assent to the defendant's proposed contract. To put this idea in
terms of the model, this statement indicates that the defendant
possessed significant compact power. The court also did not consider that the decedent was an individual dealing with a corporation (which suggests a disparity in resource social custom power)
or that the clause was phrased in legalese210 (which suggests a
disparity in discourse power because the decedent was a ski instructor by trade 211 ). Moreover, the contract released the defendant from liability even for personal injury or property
damage claims unrelated to the race. The contract provided that
the decedent released the defendant from liability for all claims
of any kind "sustained . . . during my stay at . . . [defendant's
resort]." 212 The unconscionability issue, therefore, appears to be
somewhat more complicated than the court suggests. 213
Some courts take an opposite route in applying the Contract
of Adhesion Approach. These courts hold that the contract is
not unconscionable unless it was presented on a "take-it-or-leave
it" basis and there was no opportunity to bargain. 214 For example, in Albuquerque Tire Company v. Mountain States Telephone
and Telegraph, 215 Albuquerque Tire had contracted with Mountain States for a listing in Mountain States' yellow pages. 216 The
contract limited Mountain States' liability for breach or negligence to return of the money paid for the advertisement. 217
When Mountain States negligently listed a U-Haul business'
phone number under the listing for Albuquerque Tire, Albu210. See id. at 1064-65 (using tenns such as "in consideration of," "release and
discharge," "any and all legal claims or legal liability of any kind, nature and description," "save and hold hannless").
211. /d. at 1065.
212. /d. For a similar case and court analysis involving a minor, see Jones v. Dressel, 623 P.2d 370, 374-75 (Colo. 1981) (finding no procedural unconscionability even
given the additional fact that the injured party was a minor at the time the contract was
made (age social custom power)).
213. The result in Milligan may stem, in part, from the importance of the ski industry to the Wyoming economy. A finding of unconscionability or that the contract is
one of adhesion would have potential ramifications for the entire industry.
214. See Albuquerque Tire Co. v. Mountain States Tel. & Tel. Co., 697 P.2d 128,
131 (N.M. 1985) (quoting Steven v. Fidelity & Cas. Co., 58 Cal. 2d 862, 882, 27 Cal.
Rptr. 172, 185, 377 P.2d 284, 297 {1962)).
215. 697 P.2d 128 {N.M. 1985).
216. /d. at 129 (1985).
217. /d. at 129-30.
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querque Tire sued for breach of contract. 218
The court concluded that the contract was not one of adhesion because there was no express evidence, such as failed attempts to bargain, that Albuquerque Tire could not have
negotiated the terms of the contract. 219 Mountain States, however, possessed a monopoly with respect to yellow pages,220
which suggests it possessed both resource social custom power
and prestige social custom power. Also, the contract was a standard form contract prepared by Mountain States (discourse
power). 221 Finally, Mountain States was a much larger company
than Albuquerque Tire,222 which is additional evidence of Mountain States' greater resource social custom power. Although the
court's recitation of the facts is incomplete, these facts alone suggest that Albuquerque Tire probably had little or no real opportunity to bargain. Consequently, the court's conclusion that
Albuquerque Tire failed to prove inability to bargain is suspect.
b.

The Knowing Assent Approach

The Knowing Assent Approach is closely aligned with the
Contract of Adhesion Approach in the sense that both approaches are conservative in political orientation. Under the
Knowing Assent Approach, bargaining power does not matter;
all that matters is "reality of assent. "223 This idea can be attributed to the reference in comment 1 to UCC Section 2-302 that
"[t]he principle is one of prevention of ... unfair surprise." 224
Courts applying this approach hold that there is no unconscionability if "the provisions were explained to the other party and
came to his knowledge and there was in fact a real and voluntary
meeting of the minds and not merely an objective meeting. "225
218. ld. at 129.
219. /d. See also In re Estate of Szorek, 551 N.E.2d 697 (Ill. App. Ct. 1990) (holding that a contract between a woman plaintiff and a bank that required her to pay the
bank's attorney's fees in any action between her and the bank could not be a contract of
adhesion because the plaintiff did not object to the terms and could have gone to another bank).
220. Albuquerque, 697 P.2d at 132.
221. /d. at 131.
222. See id. at 129, 132.
223. See generally Dalton, supra note 34, at 1037 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF CONTRACTS§ 208 cmt. d (1979)).
224. U.C.C. § 2-302 cmt. 1 (1995).
225. Weaver v. American Oil Co., 276 N.E.2d 144, 148 (Ind. 1971). Interestingly,
although the Weaver court stated that the crucial issue was the idea of informed con-
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Wyatt v. Dishong226 applies the Knowing Assent Approach.
Wyatt involved a covenant not to compete in a contract between
two physicians, one the employer and the other the employee. 227
When the employee left and established a practice nearby, the
employer sued, seeking to enforce the covenant by injunction. 228
The employee defended on the basis that, among other things,
the clause was unconscionable. 229 The court rejected this argument, holding that there was no procedural unconscionability
because both parties were health professionals and the employee
knew about the clause when he signed the contract (the covenant had been called to the employee's attention when the contract was made). 230
The case contains many facts that the court could have used
to assess the parties' relative power, perhaps enough to conclude
that the procedural unconscionability requirement was met by a
showing of gross inequality of bargaining power. First, the parties were in an employer-employee relationship, 231 indicating
that the employer likely possessed formal authority social custom
power and resource social custom power over the employee. Second, although the facts are somewhat murky on this point, it appears that the employer drafted the contract, including the
clause at issue (discourse power). 232 Third, the employee was
much newer to the field and business of medicine,233 suggesting a
likely disparity in the parties' information power and expert
power. Fourth, over the course of the parties' contractual relationship, the employer substantially reduced the employee's salsent, the court also devoted a substantial part of its opinion identifying inequalities in
the parties' power. Id. at 145-46 (noting Weaver's lack of education, his employment in
mostly laborer jobs, the fact that he signed the agreement without reading it because an
American Oil employee told him to do so, and the fact that American Oil drafted the
contract).
226. 469 N.E.2d 608 (Ill. App. Ct. 1984).
227. Id. at 609.
228. Id.
229. Id. at 610. The employee also argued that the covenant not to compete was
an unreasonable restraint of trade, arguing that the temporal and special limitations
were overbroad. ld. The court treated the unreasonable restraint of trade argument
and the unconscionability argument as separate grounds on which a covenant not to
compete may be found unenforceable. ld. at 610-11.
230. Id.
231. Id. at 609.
232. See id. at 609-10.
233. Id. at 609.
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ary twice, and the employee accepted these reductions. 234 These
salary reduction interactions and the unusually large breadth of
the clause (five years within a fifty-mile radius)2 35 indicate that
the employer's formal authority social custom power and resource social custom power over the employee were particularly
weighty.
The court's analysis in Jones v. Johnson 236 differs slightly
from that of the Wyatt court. Jones reflects somewhat of a hybrid of the Contract of Adhesion Approach and the Knowing
Assent Approach. Jones, a woman facing foreclosure of her
home, entered into a contract with a man named Johnson. 237
Johnson acquired title to her home by promising to assume
Jones' loan and by agreeing to pay her delinquent charges and
attorney's fees. 238 Jones agreed to continue to live in the house
and to pay Johnson $179 per month in rent, the exact amount of
the monthly mortgage payment. 239 Jones defaulted; Johnson
evicted her, and Jones sued, claiming the contract was unconscionable.240 The court held that procedural unconscionability
exists when there is an "absence of meaningful choice and where
lack of education or sophistication results in no opportunity to
understand the terms of the agreement. " 241 The court concluded
that the contract was not procedurally unconscionable, citing
both Contract of Adhesion ideas and Knowing Assent ideas:
Johnson explained the terms of the transaction to Jones.
There is no claim she was coerced or browbeaten by Johnson
to sign the documents. Jones had an opportunity to seek advice about the transaction but did not do so. All the evidence
indicates that she freely and voluntarily signed the documents
and had a free choice not to do so. Also, there were alternatives available to her. She could have allowed the foreclosure
to proceed .... Or, she could have attempted to sell the home
234. /d. at 610.
235. /d. at 609. The clause also involved an exercise of some discourse power. It
declared that, if the restrictions were deemed excessive, they could be revised to include
the "maximum reasonable restrictions" allowed under Illinois law. /d. at 610. This additional provision reflects a dexterity with legal principles that the employee probably
did not possess.
236. 761 P.2d 37 (Utah Ct. App. 1988).
237. /d. at 38.
238. /d.
239. /d.
240. /d.

241. Id. at 39.
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herself ....242
Although the court concluded that the contract was not procedurally unconscionable, it noted several facts that might have
enriched its analysis of this issue. First, Jones was a woman and
Johnson was a man243 (giving Johnson greater enfranchisement
power). Second, Jones was unemployed and experiencing financial difficulties, whereas Johnson could afford to pay the delinquencies on her notes, indicating that she lacked and he
possessed resource social custom power. 244 Third, Johnson somehow "learned of the notice of default" on Jones' property and
approached Jones with suggestions of methods of avoiding foreclosure.245 These facts suggest that Johnson possessed several
vectors of power, including information, expert, and discourse
power. Manipulation power may have been involved as well, because Johnson clearly wanted Jones to select a particular method
of avoiding foreclosure (the one by which he acquired title to her
land). His suggestion of multiple methods may have been a ploy
to gain her confidence. Finally, Jones apparently possessed only
a high school education,246 which also may have increased Johnson's information power and expert power in his dealings with
Jones.
c.

The Multivariable Approach

The Multivariable Approach involves identifying and applying a number of potential indicia of interpersonal power. Thus,
in Johnson v. Mobil Oil Corp., 247 the court held that the following factors were relevant in analyzing the relative bargaining
power of the parties: age, education, intelligence, business acumen and experience, relative bargaining power (which the court
did not define further), who drafted the contract, whether the
terms of the contract were explained, whether the terms were
negotiable, and whether there were alternate sources of supply
for the goods in question. 248 A number of courts have added an
242. ld. at 40.
243. Id.
244. Id.
245. ld. at 38.
246. Id. at 40.
247. 415 F. Supp. 264 (E.D. Mich. 1976).
248. Id. at 268. See also In re "Apollo" Air Passenger Computer Reservation Sys.,
720 F. Supp. 1061, 1065 (S.D.N.Y. 1989); Gillman v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 534
N.E.2d 824, 828 (N.Y. 1988).

116

WILLAMETTE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 33:67

additional consideration: whether the other party engaged in
"deceptive or high pressured (sales) tactics." 249 This approach
can be seen as liberal in political orientation. The use of multiple factors for analysis reflects more sympathy for the potential
of unequal bargaining power to result in an unequal bargain.
Although the breadth of this list of considerations suggests a desire for an in-depth analysis of the power relationship, in many
cases, the courts' analyses are quite limited.
In re "Apollo" Air Passenger Computer Reservation System
involved a liquidated damages clause in a contract between a
travel agency and United Airlines. 250 By the terms of the contract, United supplied the agency with a computer system for
handling airplane flight reservations in exchange for a specified
fee. 251 The agency's cancellation of the contract subjected the
agency to a substantial penalty unrelated in amount to the damages United would suffer from such a cancellation. 252 In analyzing the procedural unconscionability issue, the court cited with
approval the Johnson v. Mobil Oil Corp. list of factors described
above. 253 The court held, however, that the contract was not
procedurally unconscionable because one other similar system
existed in the United States and "[n]othing in the record indicates that the persons negotiating the contract for [the
agency] ... were of an age, education or intelligence such that
they could not understand the terms or the import of the contract entered into. "254 Thus, the court in "Apollo" Air purported
to apply a broad spectrum of power variables but, in fact, focused only on the parties' ability to understand the contract and
the availability of alternatives-a hybrid of the Contract of Adhesion and Knowing Assent approaches. 255 Also, although the
court states that the case is "sadly wanting in anything" to sup249. See Gillman, 534 N.E.2d at 828.
250. 720 F. Supp. at 1061.
251. /d. at 1063.
252. /d. at 1067.
253. /d. at 1065. It is worth noting that "Apollo" Air was decided by a federal
district court located in New York, whereas Johnson v. Mobil Oil Corp. was decided by
a district court sitting in Michigan and purportedly applying Michigan law.
254. /d. at 1064.
255. Some cases apply all of the power vectors they articulate. See, e.g., Johnson
v. Mobil Oil Corp., 415 F. Supp. 264, 268-69 (E.D. Mich. 1976) (considering plaintiff's
age, education, literacy, the fact that Mobil approached him, and the fact that Mobil's
representative did not have the authority to bargain).
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port the plaintiff's procedural unconscionability argument,256
some facts the court recited suggest that the resolution of the
issue was less obvious. First, United was a large, multimillion
dollar international company, whereas the agency was a small
individually-owned operation (a huge resource social custom
power disparity). Second, only two such computer reservation
systems were available in the entire United States, United
drafted the contract, and United offered it on a take-it-or-leaveit basis.257 These facts suggest a great disparity in the parties'
relative resource social custom power, information power, artd
discourse power. While these facts do not compel the conclusion
that the contract was procedurally unconscionable, they suggest
that the issue was more complicated than the court stated. 258
The majority of cases applying the Multivariable Approach
adopt some, but not all, of the Johnson v. Mobil Oil Corp. considerations. Typically, these courts identify three or four factors
that evidence the parties' relative power, such as the manner in
which the contract was entered into, the parties' education, their
understanding of the contract's terms, and whether the key
terms were in fine print. 259
Able Holding Company v. American District Telegraph
arose out of a contract between an amusement park and a fire
prevention system company for the installation of a fire prevention system.Z60 The contract included a clause, which the amusement park contended was unconscionable, that limited the fire
prevention company's liability for breach to the greater of ten
percent of the annual charge or $250. 261 The court defined procedural unconscionability in terms of bargaining power, holding
that the factors to be considered were the manner in which the
256. 720 F. Supp. at 1064.
257. /d.
258. Gillman involved a similar incongruity between a court's articulation of numerous power considerations and its analysis of only a few. See Gillman v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 534 N.E.2d 824, 828 (N.Y. 1988) (finding no inequality of bargaining
power with respect to a term in fine print on the back of a contract between a large
international bank and an individual because the individual (1) had time to read the
contract, (2) could have consulted an attorney, and (3) had business experience).
259. Abel Holding Co. v. American Dist. Tel., 350 A.2d 292, 304 (N.J. Super. Ct.
Law Div. 1975), affd, 371 A.2d 111 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1977). See also Ahern v.
Knecht, 563 N.E.2d 787, 792 (IJJ. App. Ct. 1990); H. Jon Geis, P.C. v. Landau, 458
N.Y.S.2d 1000, 1003 (N.Y. Civ. Ct. 1983).
260. 350 A.2d at 295.
261. /d. at 296.
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contract was entered into, the parties' education, their understanding of the contract's terms, and whether the key term was
in fine print. 262
The court held that there was no procedural unconscionability ,263 reasoning that there were fourteen competing alarm services listed in the phone book, the fire protection service
company did not prevent bargaining, and the amusement park
had fire insurance to protect itself. 264 The court also emphasized
the importance of freedom of contract and of not allowing parties out of contracts they did not read. 265
The following facts make the court's analysis of the power
issue seem significantly oversimplified: (1) two people
owned the amusement park, whereas the fire prevention system
company was large, national, and, in prior litigation, had been
determined to have engaged in monopolistic conduct in violation
of antitrust law; (2) the fire prevention system company approached the amusement park immediately after the park had
suffered damage from an earlier fire; (3) the parties did not discuss terms; and (4) the amusement park owners neither fully
read the contract nor "shopped around" for alternative fire prevention systems. 266 Thus, the court ignored the fire prevention
company's substantial information, expert, manipulation, and discourse power. Furthermore, the court did not consider the
amusement park owner's likely diminished personal qualities
power. In short, the fire prevention company possessed substantially greater power than did the amusement park owners.
Therefore, the court's conclusion that there was no procedural
unconscionability is debatable.
H. Jon Geis, P. C. v. Landau involved a claim for $3,500 arising out of a contract for psychological counseling services. 267
Although the Landau court listed only "the experience and education of the party claiming the contract to be unconscionable
268
••• "
as factors to consider, the court actually considered sev262. ld. at 304.
263. See also Haspel v. Rollins Protective Serv., Inc., 490 So. 2d 530 (La. Ct. App.
1986) (addressing whether a clause similar to that in Abel is unconscionable, and concluding that it is not).
264. 350 A.2d at 303, 305.
265. ld.
266. ld. at 302-03.
267. 458 N.Y.S.2d 1000 (N.Y. Civ. Ct. 1983).
268. ld. at 1003.
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eral other power vectors and concluded that there was sufficiently unequal bargaining power between the parties. 269 The
court considered Dr. Geis' doctorate degree, his many years of
practice, his association with a psychological institute as a supervisor, and Ms. Landau's poverty. 270 These facts evidence Geis'
superior information power, expert power, formal authority social
custom power, personal association social custom power, personal
qualities power, and resource social custom power. The court,
however, emphasized that Landau was divorced during the
course of the therapy; she felt "awful" and "strangled" by Geis,
clinging to him "as the expert" with his encouragement while he
repeatedly assured her not to worry about her growing debt to
him.271 These facts raise issues of possible disparity in the parties' relative personal qualities power, expert power, manipulation
power, and reference power. Furthermore, the court did not
mention the possible enfranchisement power implications of the
fact that Geis was a man and Landau was a woman. 272 Nevertheless, the court's opinion in Landau recognized and considered
many facts bearing on the parties' relative power and, based on
the information provided, reached an appropriate result.
Associated Press v. Southern Arkansas Radio Company 273
involved an acceleration clause in a contract between a radio station and a news service. 274 The radio station argued that the
clause, which was particularly harsh, was unconscionable. 275 The
court agreed, citing four reasons: (1) the radio station had not
read the contract; (2) no other such services were available to
the radio station; (3) the contract was a preprinted form; and
269. /d.
270. /d.
271. /d. at 1003-05.
272. See also Ahem v. Knecht, 563 N.E.2d 787, 792-93 (Ill. App. Ct. 1990) (ignoring the male-female power issues but considering not only the power implications of the
noncomplaining party's greater knowledge and expertise but also the defendant's feelings of intimidation and the plaintiff's use of high-pressure sales techniques in deciding
contract was unconscionable). But see York v. Georgia-Pacific Corp., 585 F. Supp.
1265, 1277 (N.D. Miss. 1984) (finding no unconscionability even though the party claiming unconscionability was suffering from a major depressive episode). Ahem and Landau can be contrasted with the over-simplified bargaining power analysis of the trial
court in In re Baby M, 525 A.2d 1128 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1987), affd in part, rev'd
in part, 537 A.2d 1227 (N.J. 1988), analyzed in depth below. See infra notes 301-346 and
accompanying text.
273. 809 S.W.2d 695 (Ark. Ct. App. 1991).
274. /d. at 696.
275. /d. at 697.
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(4) the radio station was already in default under the terms of
the contract at the time the contract was signed.276 Other facts
support the court's implicit conclusion that there was a power
imbalance between the parties: (1) the news service was one of
only two such services in the entire nation, whereas a married
couple owned and operated the radio station277 (indicating a
possible disparity in the parties' resource social custom power);
(2) the husband never finished college278 (which may have created imbalances in the parties' relative status social custom
power, information power, expert power, reference power, and
personal qualities power); and (3) the wife and husband represented themselves in the negotiations, whereas a large, wellknown law firm represented the news service. 279 The involvement of the law firm suggests a power disparity in the areas of
resource social custom power (the news service could afford attorneys, whereas the couple could not) and discourse power (the
attorneys probably had superior linguistic skills, contract drafting skills, and negotiating skills). The attorneys also may have
enjoyed some prestige social custom power to the extent that attorneys working for large law firms enjoy such power.
Less obvious sources of power that probably were present
but were not discussed in the court's opinion include the news
service's more extensive experience and knowledge regarding
such contracts (indicating information power and expert power)
and the news service's likely perceived trustworthiness power because of the societal perception that news organizations perform
a quasi-public service.
4.

The Power Model As a Tool for Analyzing Procedural
Unconscionability
I selected the facts of two very different, but well-known
unconscionability cases-Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture
Company280 and In re Baby M281 -to demonstrate, in greater

276. ld.
277. Id. at 695.
278. Id. at 696. There are no facts indicating the wife's educational background,
an omission that itself may be a discourse about male power and social validation of
men and social invalidation of women.
279. /d.
280. 350 F.2d 445 (D.C. Cir. 1965).
281. 525 A.2d 1128 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1987), affd in part, rev'd in part, 537
A.2d 1227 (N.J. 1988).
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depth, how the model can be used to enrich unconscionability
power analysis. This Part does not purport to analyze or describe what the courts actually said about the parties' relative
power; rather, this Part uses the facts of these cases as a springboard for application of the power model. Thus, this Part of the
Article reads the cases as a text or story and attempts to analyze
the power ramifications of the facts stated by the courts that
heard these cases.

a. Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Company282
Williams, generally regarded as the seminal unconscionability case, involved a series of household goods installment contracts between a woman, Williams, and a furniture store, WalkerThomas.283 The contracts contained a "dragnet clause," a provision that entitled Walker-Thomas to hold a security interest in all
goods Williams purchased during her multi-year relationship
with Walker-Thomas until Williams paid off all of the items. 284
Shortly after purchasing a stereo from Walker-Thomas, Williams
defaulted on her payments. 285 Walker-Thomas then sought to
replevy all of the items that Williams ever had purchased from
Walker-Thomas.286 Williams sued to have the clause deemed unconscionable and lost in the trial court, which denied her unconscionability claim without considering its substance. 287 On
appeal, the court of appeals remanded the case to the court below to consider the possible application of the doctrine of unconscionability.288 Accordingly, no published court analysis of the
procedural unconscionability issues in the case exists. The fame
of the case and the interesting story told in the opinions, however, make the case ripe for analysis in accordance with the
power model suggested above.
Application of the power model reveals that the power between the parties was substantially skewed towards WalkerThomas. First, Williams was separated from her husband, was
282. 350 F.2d 445 (D.C. Cir. 1965).
283. /d. at 447. See also Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co., 198 A.2d 914,
915 (D.C. Cir. 1964) (the lower court's opinion).
284. See 350 F.2d at 447.
285. /d.
286. /d.
287. /d.
288. /d. at 450.
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raising seven children on her own, had limited education, and
was on public assistance. 289 As a woman and a single parent,
Williams possessed less enfranchisement power and resource social custom power than Walker-Thomas. 290 Her lack of employment means she had less status social custom power. It also may
suggest that the Walker-Thomas employees with whom she dealt
had reference power as well, although the two opinions do not
provide sufficient information to assess whether Williams desired to be like the Walker-Thomas employees.
Second, there appear to be many indications in the facts
that Walker-Thomas possessed vastly superior information and
expert power. The contracts appear to have been drafted by a
person with significant business and legal experience, such as an
attorney, using legal and business vernacular throughout, including such terms as "hereafter," "pro rata," and "periodical installment payment. "291 The use of this terminology also enhanced
Walker-Thomas' discourse power.
In contrast, Williams' poverty and lack of education suggest
that she possessed little business or legal experience with which
to analyze the transactions into which she was entering. Even
her choice to enter into the transaction-a purchase of a $514
stereo on a monthly welfare check of $218292-suggests some
flaws in her economic judgment. Finally, although Williams possessed little information and expertise regarding WalkerThomas' business, Walker-Thomas knew exactly with whom it
was dealing. The reverse side of the stereo contract listed the
name of Williams' social worker and her $218-per-month stipend
from the government. 293 Consequently, Walker-Thomas must
have known that Walker-Thomas represented the only means by
which Williams could acquire household goods. At least,
Walker-Thomas clearly knew its bargaining adversary better
than she knew Walker-Thomas. This knowledge gave WalkerThomas additional information power.
The contract between Walker-Thomas and Williams con289. Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co., 198 A.2d 914, 915 (D.C. Cir.
1964).
290. Of course, Williams' wealth, such as it was, was Williams' primary source of
power over Walker-Thomas. She was a source of profit for Walker-Thomas.
291. 350 F.2d at 447.
292. 198 A.2d at 916.
293. /d.
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ferred significant power on Walker-Thomas. The contract described the transaction as a "lease," rather than a sale. 294 On its
own, this term has three significant power vector ramifications.
First, there is no evidence that Williams considered the transaction as anything other than what it appeared to be, a sale; hence,
Walker-Thomas was engaging in an exercise of some manipulation power. Second, Walker-Thomas' understanding that the
contract purported to be a lease, rather than a sale, gave WalkerThomas information power. Third, this attempt to exercise control over the nature of the transaction was an exercise of discourse power. 295
Walker-Thomas' greatest source of power appears to have
been its discourse power. The contract's use of the term "lease"
and of legal and business terminology conferred discourse power
on Walker-Thomas. The clause at issue in Williams provided:
[T]he amount of each periodical installment payment to be
made by (purchaser) to the Company under this present lease
shall be inclusive of and not in addition to the amount of each
installment payment to be made by (purchaser) under such
prior leases, bills or accounts; and all payments now and hereafter made by (purchaser) shall be credited pro rata on all outstanding leases, bills and accounts due the Company by
(purchaser) at the time each such payment is made. 296

In short, title to every purchase, new and old, remained in
Walker-Thomas until Williams made full payment on all items.
This clause had significant power ramifications.
The clause, which even the Court of Appeals described as
"rather obscure," 297 is a commentary on Walker-Thomas' superior information and discourse power. It conferred discourse
power on Walker-Thomas because only Walker-Thomas understood it. It also conferred discourse power by communicating
that Walker-Thomas was in charge. Furthermore, the clause
conferred discourse power by reinforcing and illustrating that
Walker-Thomas understood the business world in ways Williams
294. 350 F.2d at 447.
295. It is not at all clear that Walker·Thomas' attempt to elevate form over substance in defining the transaction would have succeeded had the issue been litigated.
See generally U.C.C. § 9-102 (1996) (indicating that the provisions of Article 9 apply to
a contract creating a security interest in personal property "regardless of (the contract's]
form").
296. 350 F.2d at 447 (emphasis added).
297. ld.
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did not. In fact, the evidence indicates that (1) Williams misunderstood her rights under the contracts, (2) sP.e did not read the
actual contract documents, and (3) the contract documents were
never explained to her. 298
Other sources of discourse power to Walker-Thomas were
Walker-Thomas's drafting of the contract, the length of the contracts,299 the length of the clause at issue, and the use of very fine
print in the clause. 300 Clearly, Walker-Thomas controlled the
agenda and scope of the parties' discussions.
These facts and others detailed below also demonstrate that
Walker-Thomas exercised manipulation power. The unusual circumstance of Williams agreeing to pay so much for a stereo suggests the exercise of such power. Walker-Thomas' use of
excessively complicated terminology in the key paragraph, Williams' lack of understanding of the contract, and the lack of explanation support this thesis. The possibility seems almost a
. certainty in light of the fact that: (1) most of Williams' purchases
were made at her home, (2) the contracts were signed "in
blank," with the key terms filled in later by Walker-Thomas,
(3) the paragraph at issue, providing for pro-rated payment of
purchases she made, was in "extremely fine print," and (4) she
was not provided with copies of any of the contracts. 301 It appears that Walker-Thomas deliberately kept Williams in the dark
about the contracts she was making to prevent her from making
a reasoned decision. Clearly, had the trial court analyzed the
procedural unconscionability issue, it would have concluded that
there was a gross disparity in the parties' relative bargaining
power.
b.

In Re Baby M

In Re Baby M is the famous case arising out of a surrogate
parenting contract between Mary Beth Whitehead and William
and Elizabeth Stem. 302 Whitehead agreed to be impregnated by
William Stem through artificial insemination, and William Stem
298. Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co., 198 A.2d 914, 915 (D.C. Cir.
1964).
299. The contract documents were six inches thick. /d.
300. /d.
301. /d.
302. 525 A.2d 1128 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1987), affd in part, rev'd in part, 537
A.2d 1227 (N.J. 1988).
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agreed to pay Whitehead $10,000. 303 Accordingly, Whitehead
was inseminated and carried Baby M to term. 304 After Baby M
was born, Whitehead realized she did not want to part with Baby
M and the lawsuit ensued. 305 The trial court held, in pertinent
part, that the contract did not violate public policy and was not
unconscionable. 306 The trial court also terminated Whitehead's
parental rights, finding that Baby M's best interests would be
served by giving custody to the Sterns. 307 The New Jersey
Supreme Court held, however, that the contract was illegal and
violated public policy. 308 The court also held that the trial court
improperly terminated Whitehead's parental rights309 and failed
to consider adequately Whitehead's visitation rights. 31 Finally,
the court affirmed the trial court's conclusion that Baby M's best
interests would be served by having her remain with the
Sterns. 311 The New Jersey Supreme Court did not address the
unconscionability issue.
Although the New Jersey Supreme Court ultimately did not
resolve the case based on unconscionability, the issue remains an
interesting one. The two opinions of In Re Baby M identify a
large number of facts that could have been used to analyze the
complex power relationship between the Sterns and Whitehead.
Application of the power model reveals that the balance of
power tilted significantly in favor of the Sterns. Even where
Whitehead possessed power, the Sterns had substantial offsetting
power.
As a man, Mr. Stern possessed gender enfranchisement
power. Furthermore, from the facts as a whole, the Sterns probably possessed greater social class enfranchisement power than did

°

303. In re Baby M, 537 A.2d 1227, 1265-69 (N.J. 1988). Courts refer to such contracts as "surrogate parenting contracts." See, e.g., In re Baby M, 525 A.2d at 1137. A
surrogate parenting contract is defined as a contract between a man and a woman or a
couple and a woman that calls for the woman, hereinafter the "gestator," to be "artificially inseminated or implanted with a fertilized egg, carry the child to term and, after
delivery, relinquish all parental rights and give the child to its natural father who was, of
course, the sperm donor." ld.
304. In re Baby M, 537 A.2d at 1236.
305. ld. at 1236-38.
306. 525 A.2d at 1159-60.
307. /d. at 1170.
308. 537 A.2d at 1240-50.
309. /d. at 1252.
310. /d. at 1261-63.
311. /d. at 1258.
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Whitehead. 312 The Stems also possessed much more social custom power than did Whitehead. The Sterns possessed more age
social custom power; they were in their forties, whereas Whitehead was in her twenties. 313 In addition, the Stems also possessed formal authority, prestige, and norms and values social
custom power, which Whitehead lacked. The Stems had doctoral degrees (Mrs. Stem also had a medical degree), whereas
Whitehead never graduated from high schooP14 These facts
suggest that the Stems not only had greater education status, but
also had power from their titles ("doctor"), which conferred
norms and values social custom power, prestige, and formal authority. In contrast, Whitehead, who was not working outside
her home, had only ever worked for a pizza-deli and her
brother's delicatessen. 315 Further, the related norm of deference
to medical doctors conferred additional power on Mrs. Stem.
It might be argued that a different social norm, in favor of
women not working outside the home, conferred power on
Whitehead. However, this social norm actually may be a source
of disempowerment to Whitehead or, at least, not a particularly
efficacious source of power. People who do not work outside
the home and therefore depend on spouses for financial support
tend to lack resource social custom power and prestige social custom power. Finally, Whitehead testified that she was motivated
to become a surrogate by the Stems' responsibility oughtness social custom power (the idea that one should help those who need
help). Whitehead testified that "she was motivated to join the
(surrogacy) program in the hopes of 'giving the most loving gift
of happiness to an unfortunate couple.' " 316
The parties' relative resource social custom power is much
more complex. It appears each party possessed a resource the
other wanted; Whitehead possessed the childbearing capacity
that the Stems wanted, and the Stems possessed the wealth that
Whitehead lacked. No doubt Whitehead's ability to carry the
312. It is difficult, without additional infonnation, to reach a certain conclusion
regarding the parties' relative social class. The parties' disparate incomes, educational
achievements, career, and life histories (Whitehead married at sixteen, whereas the
Sterns married while in graduate school, 525 A.2d at 1138, 1140) are significant evidence of a social class difference.
313. 525 A.2d 1128, 1138, 1140 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1987).
314. /d.
315. /d. at 1140-41.
316. !d. at 1142.
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Stems' future child conferred significant power on Whitehead.
However, the Whiteheads had fairly grave financial problems.
They declared bankruptcy a few years before the parties entered
into negotiations, and, by the time the suit was filed, were in
default on two mortgages. 317 Also, Mr. Whitehead had held
seven different jobs in the prior thirteen years and relied on unemployment compensation at least once as his sole source of income.318 Although the New Jersey Supreme Court rejected the
idea that this contract involved an exploitation of the poor by
the rich, the New Jersey Supreme Court suggested the parties'
disparate wealth played a part. 319 The court also suggested that
a woman's need for money may make her assent to a surrogacy
contract less than voluntary. 320 It seems likely that Whitehead's
ability to maximize her resource social custom power probably
was inhibited by her lack of other power sources, particularly her
relative lack of information, expert, persona/qualities, and discourse power. On balance, the Sterns had greater useable resource social custom power. 321
The Sterns clearly possessed greater expert and information
power. Whitehead possessed some pertinent knowledge and experience; she had carried two of her own children, had attempted to become a surrogate on one prior occasion, and had
consulted with an attorney regarding that prior attempt. 322 The
Stems, however, possessed even greater pertinent knowledge;
therefore, Whitehead's knowledge was not a source of significant and efficacious information power. As a medical doctor,
Mrs. Stem had greater depth and breadth of technical knowledge regarding pregnancy and childbirth than Whitehead.
Evidence of Mrs. Stem's greater information and expert
power can be found in the events following contract formation
and successful impregnation of Whitehead. 323 During the course
317. /d. at 1140-41.
318. /d.
319. 537 A.2d 1227, 1249 (N.J. 1988).
320. !d. at 1241.
321. Another commentator might conclude that, given the Stems' strong desire
for a child and need for a surrogate to carry that child, Whitehead possessed .at least as
much resource social custom power as the Sterns possessed.
322. 525 A.2d at 1140, 1142.
323. Of course, postformation events are of only limited relevance to the parties'
pre-formation power relationship. However, they do give clues of operations of power
present at the time of contract formation.

128

WILLAMETTE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 33:67

of the Baby M pregnancy, Mrs. Stem "insisted that Mrs. Whitehead undergo amniocentesis, take a prescription pharmaceutical . . . and take certain precautions when Mrs. Whitehead
reported an elevation in blood pressure .... "324 The court's use
of the word "insisted" and the fact that the parties' relationship
"deteriorated" after these events325 suggests that the Stems' will
overcame any disinclination on the part of Whitehead. There is
also evidence that Whitehead did not understand the benefits
she was to receive nor the risks she was assuming under the contract,326 suggesting that Whitehead's information power was
limited.
Whitehead's consultation with an attorney did not confer
much power on her. She consulted with an attorney only because the surrogacy program required it; and she did not consult
with an attorney in connection with her contract with the
Stems. 327 In any event, by the terms of the contract, the Stems
were responsible for paying any attorney Whitehead consulted.328 Consequently, Whitehead may have logically concluded that any attorney she consulted would not necessarily act
solely with her best interests in mind. Moreover, Whitehead's
threat to take Baby M out of the country and the fact that she
disappeared with Baby M for 87 days 329 indicate Whitehead's
lack of faith in the legal system. 330 Finally, the Stems' greater
wealth and business experience also resulted in their greater financial and money management information power.
The Sterns' personal qualities were also a source of power
for the Stems over Whitehead. The Sterns' educational and career achievements bespeak a significant amount of determination, ambition, and drive. The trial court also found that the
Stems were mentally healthy and had close friendships and
neighbors. 331 In contrast, the trial court found that Whitehead
324. 525 A.2d at 1143-44 (emphasis added).
325. ld.
326. /d. at 1142.
327. ld. at 1142-43.
328. ld. at 1160.
329. ld. at 1145.
330. On the other hand, at Whitehead's request, the attorney did negotiate some
minor changes in the terms of Whitehead's first surrogacy contract. ld. at 1142.
331. /d. at 1140, 1167. Personal qualities power is socially constructed. The suggestion that the Sterns possessed greater personal qualities power merely reflects that
the Sterns possessed more of those qualities that society tends to value.
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was suffering from one or more emotional problems (one expert
witness testified her problem was so severe that she suffered
from an emotional disorder) and that her husband was an
alcoholic. 332
It is worth noting that the suggestion by the trial court and
some of the expert witnesses that Whitehead had emotional
problems may have been the product of significant social construction. First, as the New Jersey Supreme Court indicates,
Mrs. Stem's fears of pregnancy substantially exceeded the actual
risk of harm; the risk that pregnancy would have caused her
blindness or paraplegia was minimal, according to medical authorities.333 Thus, her decision not to bear children could be
seen as reflecting some neurosis on her part. Likewise, Mr.
Stem's fervent desire "to continue his bloodline" 334 could be
viewed as self-obsessed. The fact that neither Stem was diagnosed with an emotional disorder may reflect the Stems' class
affiliations with the psychologists and psychiatrists evaluating
the parties. Moreover, as the supreme court states, "Mrs. Whitehead was rather harshly judged ... by some of the experts. "335
The New Jersey Supreme Court argues that her actions were not
so irrational in light of her experience: she was told that she was
a bad mother and had to part with a child to whom she had become attached. 336 Thus, some of the Stems' personal qualities
power may have stemmed from the fact that their neuroses were
of a type sanctioned by mental health professionals, whereas
Whitehead's neuroses were not.
The Stems may have used manipulation power in their dealings with Whitehead. Although the contract describes Mrs.
Stem as the "infertile wife," the Stems do not appear to have
disclosed or explained the significance of Mrs. Stem's multiple
sclerosis. The Sterns certainly did not disclose that the fears that
led Mrs. Stem to forgo child-bearing were based on minimal
medical risks. Thus, the Stems used their manipulation power to
induce Whitehead to confer oughtness social custom power on
them.
Perhaps the Stems' most significant source of power was
332.
333.
334.
335.
336.

/d. at 1141, 1150, 1153.
537 A.2d 1227, 1235 (N.J. 1988).
/d.
/d. at 1259.
/d.
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their discourse power. Before Whitehead ever met the Stems,
she was given a message that the prospective parents, and not
she, were in control of the agenda. First, Whitehead learned of
the surrogacy program from a newspaper advertisement,337
which read, in part, "SURROGATE MOTHER WANTED.
Couple unable to have child willing to pay $10,000 fee and expenses to carry husband's child .... "338 This advertisement communicated two things: (1) others had set the fee at $10,000,339
and (2) the child unquestionably would be the husband's.
The structure of the parties' relationship as employer and
employee was recapitulated in the process by which the parties
were brought together. The Stems were given resumes ("biographical data") regarding potential "candidates" and attempted
to schedule "interviews" with candidates. 340 The use of a contract, particularly a form contract,341 also suggests an employment relationship and therefore is a discourse about
Whitehead's lack of power. Taken together, these structural
matters evidence that the Stems, not Whitehead, controlled the
agenda and setting for the parties' interactions.
Likewise, the terms and language of the contract were
sources of discourse power to the Stems. By the terms of the
contract, in exchange for $10,000 plus payment of medical bills
and other related expenses,342 Whitehead endured psychological
testing and relinquished all rights to any child, to control the
course of her pregnancy, to terminate the pregnancy because of
birth defects, and to assess the wisdom of undergoing amniocentesis.343 Whitehead also expressly assumed the risks of
pregnancy and childbirth. 344
In short, for a relatively small sum of money, Whitehead
assumed all the risk and the Stems held all the control. The
mandatory psychological testing and amniocenteses were
designed to give the Stems information power over Whitehead,
337. 525 A.2d 1128, 1162 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1987).
338. /d. (emphasis added).
339. Whitehead never disputed the amount, even though amicus later characterized it as "so low as to be unconscionable." /d. at 1160.
340. /d. at 1142.
341. /d.
342. These terms are an almost perfect recapitulation of standard employment
contracts, salary plus medical insurance.
343. 525 A.2d at 1142.
344. /d.
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and, more importantly, communicate that Whitehead was the
only party about whom fitness was a relevant concern. Given
that Whitehead was to supply half of the biological make-up of
the child, had Whitehead possessed any power, the contract
might have contained a clause subjecting the Stems to psychological testing before Whitehead would allow them to raise her
child. By subjecting only Whitehead to testing, the contract
communicated that the Stems were in control and conferred additional power on them.
Finally, the contract language communicated a power
message slanted toward the Stems. In accordance with standard
terminology, the contract referred to Whitehead as "Surrogate,"
rather than "Mother," "Biological Mother," or "Birth Mother";
and referred to Mr. Stem as "Natural Father," rather than
"Sperm Donor." 345 These language choices communicate a
number of things about the parties' power. The choice of the
word "Surrogate" not only ignored the prospective child's biological make-up entirely, but also objectified Whitehead by deflating the significance of her role to that of a "stand-in." The
term "Surrogate" must be contrasted with Mr. Stern's title,
"Natural Father," especially in light of the fact that Mrs. Stem
was going to be primarily responsible for child care. 346 Taken
together, the message is unmistakable: Mr. Stem matters, but
Whitehead is merely a tool brought in to solve a problem. This
choice of language, therefore, was a source of power, a means by
which power was imposed, and a recapitulation of the parties'
power relationship. 347
c.

Summary: Application of the Power Model to
Unconscionability Analysis
The question of whether procedural unconscionability infected a particular contractual relationship is a complex one.
Analysis of Williams and Baby M reveals that power operates in
345. 537 A.2d 1227, 1265-70 (N.J. 1988). The contract referred to Mrs. Stern as
the "Infertile Wife," 525 A.2d at 1162, which may be a discourse about Mrs. Stern
somehow being blamed for her inability to safely bear children. This issue is beyond
the scope of the Article.
346. 525 A.2d at 1148.
347. Terms of a contract may confer power by establishing the boundaries within
which the parties are interacting. This possibility is especially likely here, where Whitehead previously had seen and negotiated a virtually identical contract before she met
the Sterns.
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human relationships in multifarious and often unseen ways.
Power can be inscribed in a word, an advertisement, a title, and
wealth. It even may exist in the possession of acceptable
neuroses.
Courts have been slow to recognize and confront the actual
operation of power in the world. Instead, courts continue to wed
themselves to formulations of procedural unconscionability of
only minimal substance. Courts that limit procedural unconscionability to contracts for necessities between individuals and monopolies (Contract of Adhesion Approach) or to bargains not
knowingly assented to (Knowing Assent Approach) miss the issue altogether. Even courts applying the Multivariable Approach ignore the most important operations of power, those not
obvious or observable.
The parties themselves may recognize obvious operations of
power, such as commercial strength (resource social custom
power). The model described above, however, allows both parties and courts to perceive the operation of other, less visible but
equally important kinds of power. It is not always easy to recognize the operation of power vectors such as enfranchisement
power, social custom power, reference power, perceived trustworthiness power, personal qualities power, manipulation power, and
discourse power. Thus, the above model operates like a microscope; it reveals information otherwise invisible.
Using this tool, parties and courts have the information they
need to reach better results. Parties can arm themselves with
information power derived from recognizing power assertions of
the persons with whom they deal. Courts can use the model to
achieve better results. In short, the model can improve how
courts and bargaining parties assess contractual power imbalances that might produce unfair bargains.
B. Arbitration as a Means of Dispute Resolution
1. Introduction

For several years, commentators, courts, and others have
enthusiastically praised the idea of ADR in all of its forms. 348
Some, including myself, however, have questioned the value of
348. See, e.g., Jane Byeff Kom, Changing Our Perspective on Arbitration: A Traditional and a Feminist View, 1991 U. ILL. L. REv. 67; Jethro K. Lieberman & James F.
Henry, Lessons from the Alternative Dispute Resolution Movement, 53 U. CHI. L. REv.
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one or more forms of ADR. 349 In an earlier Article, I catalog
the criticisms that have been made regarding ADR in general
and arbitration in particular, and add my own criticisms. 350
Edward Brunet argues that all forms of ADR, including arbitration, erode the guidance function of laws. 351 Brunet also argues that ADR lacks the essential qualities and procedures
necessary for "quality decision making. "352
Brunet's thesis and anecdotal evidence is all we have to assess the efficacy of arbitration as a means of dispute resolution.
Arbitration occurs in private. 353 Only the parties attend, there is
no court reporter, and the arbitrator's conclusions of law and
fact are final and not reviewable on appeai.3 54 There is no way
424 (1986); Alan S. Rau, Resolving Disputes Over Attorneys' Fees: The Role of ADR, 46
SMU L. REv. 2005 (1993).
349. See, e.g., Edward Brunet, Questioning the Quality of Alternative Dispute Resolution, 62 TuL. L. REv. 1 (1987); Delgado et al., supra note 70, at 1388-89; Grillo, supra
note 62; Richard Reuben, The Dark Side of ADR, CAL. LAw., Feb. 14, 1994, at 53;
Michael Hunter Schwartz, From Star to Supernova to Dark, Cold Neutron Star: The
Early Life, the Explosion and the Collapse of Arbitration, 22 W. STATE U. L. REv. 1
(1994).
.
350. Schwartz, supra note 349, at 13-24. I argue that arbitration's deficiencies include: (1) inadequate claim and defense disclosure, (2) insufficient exchange of evidence, (3) lack of evidentiary limits on the presentation of the parties' cases, (4) lack of
qualifications, control, or oversight of arbitrators, (5) loss of the right to a jury trial,
(6) ability of arbitrators to create their own evidence, (7) loss of the efficiency benefits
of consolidation and party joinder, (8) greater potential for bias, (9) loss of the value to
society from the creation of precedent, (10) lack of legal standards, and (11) lack of
review of arbitral results. /d. Ultimately, I conclude that some of these deficiencies
cannot be remedied at all, and that those deficiencies that can be remedied can be fixed
only by sacrificing the asserted benefits of arbitration. /d. at 35.
351. See Brunet, supra note 349, at 23.
352. /d. at 2-26, 33-35. A recent article in the Los Angeles Times describes the
arbitration practices of Kaiser Foundation Health Plan. Michael A. Hiltzik & David R.
Olmos, 'Kaiser Justice' System's Fairness is Questioned, L.A. TrMES, Aug. 30, 1995, at
Al. The article describes what California lawyers call "Kaiser Justice." Kaiser, perhaps
the largest user of arbitration services in California, opens an estimated 700 medical
malpractice arbitration cases each year. /d. at A12. Kaiser and its attorneys keep close
tabs on the decisions of arbitrators who have sat on their cases. Furthermore, some
arbitrators have heard more than twenty cases involving Kaiser. /d. Critics argue that
the volume of Kaiser's cases gives arbitrators a business incentive to decide cases in
favor of Kaiser. /d. The possibility that such an incentive exists is supported by an
Alameda County trial court judge's conclusion that the entire system by which Kaiser
conducts its medical malpractice arbitrations is "'fraudulent, unconscionable and corrupt ... in general."' /d. at A21. Interestingly, according to the Times, Kaiser arbitrations actually take longer to complete than court trials. /d. at A12. Kaiser's practices
support Brunet's assertion that ADR produces poor-quality decisions.
353. Rau, supra note 348, at 2029.
354. See Schwartz, supra note 349, at 22-23.
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to test the quality of arbitrators' decisions.
Consequently, the process of arbitration needs examination.
Application of the above-described power model to the arbitration process reveals that the concerns about arbitration stem
mostly from power and empowerment deficiencies of the arbitration process. Arbitration greatly inflates the arbitrator's
power, while greatly deflating the participants' power.
In some cases, this distortion of power may be irrelevant;
the only potential for harm stems from the parties' experience of
the power imbalance. A person who experiences a power imbalance may become depressed, develop a sense of learned helplessness, and abuse others less powerful than herself. 355 The lack
of restraints on arbitrators also creates a substantial risk of undesirable results, and increases the likelihood that arbitrators will
act on prejudice. 356 At a minimum, Delgado and his colleagues'
observations about bias in ADR lend credence to Brunet's fear
that arbitrators may make poor decisions and Richard Rueben's
concern that arbitrators make decisions based on their own economic self-interest and desire to obtain return business. 357
2.

Past Scholarly Analysis of Power in Arbitration

There has been little or no explicit attempt to analyze power
as it bears on arbitration. A few commentators, however, have
raised concerns that have power ramifications.
Owen Fiss' oft-cited Against Settlement discusses the issue of
power explicitly. 358 Fiss argues that those who possess less
power due primarily to a lack of economic resources select "settlement," including arbitration, because they possess less
power. 359 Delgado and his colleagues also confront some power
issues as they bear on all forms of ADR, including arbitration. 360
They argue that the lack of restraints on ADR decision makers
stems from the informality and intimacy of ADR, and the lack of
overt references in ADR processes to social values such as fair355. See supra notes 81-86 and accompanying text.
356. Delgado et al., supra note 70, at 1388-89. The lack of restraints allows the
"human propensity to prejudge and make irrational categorizations" to flourish. Id.
357. See, Reuben, supra note 349, at 54.
358. Owen Fiss, Against Settlement, 93 YALE L.J. 1073 (1984).
359. ld. at 1073-78.
360. Delgado et al., supra note 70.
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ness and equality. 361 This concern recognizes the deficiencies in
the social norms and values social custom power restraints on
ADR decision makers.
Although Fiss and Delgado et al. have considered some
general power ramifications of ADR, the specific power ramifications of the arbitration process have not been addressed. The
power model described in Part III of this Article offers some
different and unique insights into arbitration as a means of dispute resolution.
3.

The Power Model Applied to Arbitration as a Means of
Dispute Resolution

This subpart addresses two questions: (1) What can the
power model tell us about arbitration as a means of dispute resolution? and (2) To what extent, if any, does the arbitration process empower its users? The answer to both questions appears
to be that arbitration, perhaps uniquely among all forms of dispute resolution, tends to confer virtually unchecked power on
the arbitrator while disempowering the parties. Moreover, most
of the commentators' criticisms of arbitration described above
derive from the power, empowerment, and disempowerment
ramifications of the arbitration process.
At the outset, it is worth noting that there are power and
empowerment issues regarding arbitration that are unrelated to
the power and empowerment of the arbitrator and the parties. 362
The process and progress of the recent arbitration explosion has
systemic power implications. The vast increase in the criticism of
court adjudication can be seen as the dynamite that has caused
the arbitration explosion. The court system has responded to the
threat to its dominance by defining and confining the solutionarbitration (or, more generally, ADR). 363 This process communicates a message: genuine reform of the legal system is not
needed; arbitration (ADR) will solve our problems. In fact, at361. Id. at 1387-89. In contrast, in adjudication, social values of fairness and
equality are evoked by the flag, the courtroom setting, and the judge in her robe.
362. As the Kaiser experience demonstrates, arbitration clauses often are imposed
on less powerful persons by more powerful others such as Kaiser. See Hiltzik & Olmos,
supra note 352, at A12 (stating that Kaiser "mandates" arbitration).
363. Schwartz, supra note 349, at 22, 35.
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tomeys and judges increasingly serve as arbitrators. 364 Thus, the
increased use of arbitration to resolve disputes can be seen as
the means by which attorneys and judges have preserved their
power by controlling the societal response to the threat posed by
criticism of court adjudication.
4.

Vectors of Power in the Arbitration Process

Social custom power plays a large role in the arbitration process. The arbitrator derives social custom power from various
sources. First, the arbitrator's title and status as decision maker
confer prestige social custom power and formal authority social
custom power.
Surprisingly, arbitrators' formal authority social custom
power may exceed that of judges. The power of judges in court
adjudication is limited by several forces: (1) precedent, (2) appellate review, (3) written opinions, (4) competency review, and
(5) selection and re-election processes. Some of these limits
transfer power to the parties, who can challenge the judge's decisions by appeal and challenge a judge's competency by complaining to the appropriate state agency. These sources of
formal authority social custom power and resource social custom
power are not particularly efficacious; however, they do confer
some power to the parties.
The foregoing limits on judges' power either do not apply to
an arbitrator or apply only on a very limited basis. First, arbitrators are not required to follow precedent; in fact, both commentators and courts express a sentiment that arbitrators should not
follow precedent but, rather, should follow their own sense of
natural justice. 365 The arbitrator's sense of natural justice is
either no standard at all for decision making or is an extremely
limited standard. The standard confers virtually unlimited discretion (and therefore power) on the arbitrator.
Second, appellate review of arbitration is extremely limited.
364. See generally Louis J. Weber, Court-Referred ADR and the Lawyer-Mediator:
In Service of Whom?, 46 SMU L. REv. 2113, 2115-16 (1993).
365. See Moncharsh v. Heily & Blase, 3 Cal. 4th 1, 11, 832 P.2d 899, 904 (1992);
Korn, supra note 348, at 102. See also Fairview Hosp. Ass'n v. Pacific Bldg. Serv. &
Hosp. & Inst. Employees Union Local No. 113,64 N.W.2d 16,30 (Minn. 1954); Flood v.
Caron, 441 A.2d 733, 735 (N.H. 1982); Hoboken Mfrs.' R.R. Co. v. Hoboken R.R.
Warehouse & Steamship Connecting Co., 27 A.2d 150, 155 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div.
1942), affd, 31 A.2d 801 (N.J. 1943).
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In most jurisdictions, an appellate court may overturn an arbitration decision only on a showing of fraud, corruption, or undue
means. 366 Appellate courts do not review the arbitrator's conclusions of fact or law, her interpretation of contract, or her application of law to fact, no matter how egregious an error may
be. 367 This source of power for the arbitrator is a source of disempowerment for the parties. The arbitrator is not fettered by
the threat of review (more formal authority social custom power
for the arbitrator), and the parties know they cannot challenge
the arbitrator's decision (less formal authority social custom
power to the parties). 368
The foregoing sources of formal authority social custom
power disempower the parties in an unexpected way. In court
adjudication, the presence of legal standards and the threat of
appellate review combine to give some predictability to the result. Case results, of course, depend on factors such as the indefiniteness of precedent and social policy and the problems of
proof, including witness credibility and reliable documentation.
However, precedent does influence the parties in their settlement decision making. In arbitration, the parties lack this source
of information power.
Third, unlike a judge, an arbitrator need not explain the reasons for her decision. 369 In fact, the American Arbitration Asso366. See, e.g., Moncharsh, 3 Cal. 4th at 21-22,832 P.2d at 911. See also Ahtna, Inc.
v. Ebasco Constructors, Inc., 894 P.2d 657, 661 (Alaska 1995); Fischer v. Guaranteed
Concrete Co., 151 N.W.2d 266, 270 (Minn. 1967); Graber v. Comstock Bank, 905 P.2d
1112, 1115 (Nev. 1995); Bailey & Williams v. Westfall, 727 S.W.2d 86, 90 (Tex. Ct. App.
1987); Boyd v. Davis, 127 Wash. 2d 256, 897 P.2d 1239, 1244 (1995) (Utter, J., concurring); Riverton Valley Elec. Ass'n v. Pacific Power & Light, 391 P.2d 489, 500 (Wyo.
.
1964).
367. See, e.g., Moncharsh, 3 Cal. 4th at 21-22, 832 P.2d at 911; Columbine Valley
Constr. Co. v. Board of Directors, Roaring Fork Sch. Dist. RE-lJ, 626 P.2d 686, 695
(Colo. 1981); 0 & G/O'Connell Joint Venture v. Chase Family Ltd. Partnership No.3,
523 A.2d 1271, 1281 (Conn. 1987); Graber, 905 P.2d at 1116. See also Stephen Hayford
& Ralph Peeples, Commercial Arbitration in Evolution: An Assessment and Call for
Dialogue, 10 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. REsoL. 343, 366-67 (1995).
368. The finality of arbitral awards distinguishes arbitration from mediation as a
form of dispute resolution. Although mediation awards cannot be subjected to appellate review, a mediator's recommendations are subject to approval by each of the parties. Thus, unlike the parties to an arbitration, the parties to a mediation retain some
power over their fate, the power to say "no."
369. See, e.g., Sapp v. Barenfeld, 34 Cal. 2d 515, 522, 212 P.2d 233, 239 (1949);
Riverton, 391 P.2d at 500. See generally Lynn Katzler, Comment, Should Mandatory
Written Opinions Be Required in All Securities Arbitrations?: The Practical and Legal
Implications to the Securities Industry, 45 AM. U. L. REv. 151, 164-66 (1995).
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ciation (AAA) tells its arbitrators that they should not explain
their decisions in order to insulate their decisions from review. 370
This factor creates another freedom from restriction for the arbitrator, which increases her formal authority social custom power.
The lack of scrutiny and restriction on the arbitrator's decision,
combined with the privacy and informality of arbitration, not
only increases the likelihood that the arbitrator will indulge her
biases and prejudices, 371 but also decreases the parties' formal
authority social custom power and resource social custom power.
Fourth, arbitrators have no established ethical obligations,
and there is no existing process for reviewing the competency of
arbitrators or investigating complaints. 372 Moreover, there is no
requirement that a written record of an arbitral hearing be
made. In fact, arbitrators are required and encouraged to make
sure the disputes before them remain secret. 373 Therefore, the
only existing check on arbitrator honesty is the arbitrator herself. 374 Thus, the parties have no true outlet for their complaints
and suffer a concomitant loss of their already limited formal authority social custom power and resource social custom power.
Fifth, although the power to select an arbitrator is a unique
source of formal authority social custom power, that power is not
as efficacious as it first appears. Not only does this power cease
once the selection is made, but also the parties' choice of an arbitrator often is limited. If the parties' contract does not specify a
method of selecting an arbitrator, the judge will select one for
them. 375 If the parties have adopted the AAA's rules, a very
common provision in contractual arbitration clauses, selection of
arbitrators is particularly truncated. The AAA selects the arbitrator in matters involving less than $50,000. 376 In matters involving more than $50,000, the AAA sends each party a short
Rau, supra note 348, at 2028 n.85.
See supra notes 331-333 and accompanying text.
See Reuben, supra note 349, at 56-57.
See generally Phillip Rothman, Psst, Please Keep it ConfidentiaL· Arbitration
Makes it Possible, 49 DISP. REsoL. J., Sept. 1994, at 69.
374. Arbitrators are expected to self-monitor conflicts of interest. Reuben, supra
370.
371.
372.
373.

note 349, at 55.
375. See, e.g., CAL. C1v. PRoc. CoDE § 1281.6 (West 1994); FLA. STAT. ANN.
§ 682.04 (West 1990); IOWA CODE ANN. § 679A.3 (West 1987); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN.
Ch. 251, § 3 (West 1988); OR. REv. STAT. § 36.320 (1995); WASH. REv. CODE ANN.
§ 7.04.050 (West 1992).
376. AMERICAN ARB. Ass'N CONSTR. INDUS. ARB. RULES§ 54(a), at 19 (1993).
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list from which to choose their arbitrator. 377 The AAA makes
no mention of a right to refuse all of the arbitrators. 378 These
facts are particularly significant because there are no legally required qualifications to be or hold oneself out as an arbitrator. 379
Consequently, the arbitrator selection process actually may be a
source of disempowerment for the parties because their choices
are either very limited or nonexistent.
Norms and values social custom power also plays an important and complex role in the power ramifications of arbitration.
The arbitrator gains power because the informality and secrecy
of arbitration limit the effectiveness of the usual constraints that
norms and values place on a decision maker. As Delgado et al.
argue, arbitrators are more likely to prejudge and to be biased,
racist, or sexist than are judges or juries.380 Moreover, unlike a
judge, an arbitrator takes no oath. 381 From a power standpoint,
these facts indicate arbitrators possess greater power than judges
because arbitrators are not restrained by social values and norms
and arbitrating parties possess less power than they would have
had if they had resorted to court adjudication. 382
Like a judge or jury, an arbitrator likely is perceived by the
parties as trustworthy. The lack of social restraint suggested by
Delgado et al. implies that, while the arbitrator possesses significant perceived trustworthiness power, the parties may lack the information power to know that the arbitration process itself
fosters arbitrator bias.
Arbitrators possess a substantial amount of information
power. In many arbitrations, the arbitrator possesses relevant
knowledge of the industry or trade that is the context for the
dispute. 383 In fact, the arbitrator may be perceived as an expert
in the field that is the subject of the parties' dispute. The fact
that the parties desire this expertise does not change the fact that
377. Id. § 13, at 9.
378. See, e.g., id.
379. See, e.g., Robinson v. Superior Ct., 35 Cal. 2d 379, 387, 218 P.2d 10, 16 (1950).
380. See Delgado et al., supra note 70, at 1388-89.
381. See, e.g., 6 Cal. Jur. § 36, at 77 (3d. ed. 1988).
382. This issue is one of degree. As Gabel and Harris argue, the formality of
adjudication legitimizes the systematic repression of those who lack power by causing
them to consider themselves beneath those who possess power. Gabel & Harris, supra
note 69, at 372-73.
383. Rau, supra note 348, at 2029.
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it diminishes a usual source of party empowerment present in
court adjudication, expert power.
Moreover, the arbitrator can obtain additional information
without any participation by the parties, a source of power that a
judge lacks. In adjudication, the parties control the flow of information to the decision maker. In contrast, at least in California, an arbitrator may conduct an independent investigation of
the facts, outside the presence of the parties and their counseP84
The arbitrator also may consult with technical experts of her
choosing385 and seek advice on legal issues from a disinterested
attorney. 386
These sources of power can supplement the arbitrator's already extensive discourse power because the arbitrator is engaged in a form of agenda-setting. In addition, the arbitrator,
like a judge, sets the scene for the parties' hearing. She controls
the parties' and attorneys' conduct by her intermediate rulings·
and decisions, and she may even possess a limited contempt
power. 387 She controls the number of arbitral hearings, in addition to the duration and progress of each day of the hearing. 388
Unlike a judge, the arbitrator also may control the physical positioning of the parties, the formality of the proceedings, the manner in which evidence is presented (e.g., by narrative or by
question and answer), whether the parties and witnesses swear
an oath, and even the location of the arbitral hearing. 389
Like a judge, the arbitrator rules on evidentiary issues.
However, unlike a judge, the arbitrator may admit evidence that
would be barred under current legal standards. 390 This discretion, widely exercised in arbitral hearings, also confers discourse
384. See Canadian Indem. Co. v. Ohm, 271 Cal. App. 2d 703, 708-09, 76 Cal. Rptr.
902, 905 (1969). But see Fred J. Brotherton, Inc. v. Kreielsheimer, 83 A.2d 707, 709
(N.J. 1951); Goldfinger v. Lisker, 500 N.E.2d 857, 864 (N.Y. 1986).
385. See, e.g., 1\vin Lakes Reservoir & Canal Co. v. Platt Rogers, Inc. 147 P.2d
828, 833 (Colo. 1944); Gord v. F.S. Harmon & Co., 188 Wash. 134, 61 P.2d 1294, 1297
(1936).
386. Griffith Co. v. San Diego College for Women, 45 Cal. 2d 501, 506-07, 289
P.2d. 476, 479 (1955). See also Litman v. Holtzman, 149 A.2d 385, 390 (Md. 1959).
387. See CAL. Civ. PRoc. CoDE§ 1282.6 (West 1994).
388. See, e.g., id. § 1282.2(a).
389. A judge possesses a crucial source of power that an arbitrator lacks, direct
access to force power. See generally supra note 94 and accompanying text. The arbitrator can obtain access to force only if a judge becomes involved.
·
390. See, e.g., CAL. Crv. PRoc. CoDE§ 1282.2(d) (West 1994); 0 & G/O'Connell
Joint Venture v. Chase Family Ltd. Partnership No. 3, 523 A.2d 1271, 1279 (Conn.
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power on the arbitrator. Interestingly, it both confers and
reduces the parties' discourse power. On the one hand, the par-

ties are not limited by evidence law. On the other hand, the lack
of standards reduces predictability and, hence, control. Even
confidential or privileged information may be disclosed, contrary
to the parties' wishes. 391
Another source of information and discourse disempowerment of the parties stems from the fact that they cannot compel
each other to disclose claims, defenses, witnesses, or evidence
until the day of the hearing, when the arbitrator's subpoena
power is least efficient. In addition, arbitration law requires no
discovery in any form. 392 In fact, in California, if the amount of
the claim is less than $50,000, neither party has to disclose the
name or nature of any witnesses' testimony, including both
percipient and expert witnesses. 393 The lack of disclosure is a
possible source of empowerment to a party inclined to hide information; however, each party can withhold key information.
The lack of disclosure disempowers the parties by stripping them
of information power. It also contributes to a decrease in the
parties' formal authority social custom power to settle their dispute because they cannot assess adequately the efficacy of their
contentions.
Consequently, the parties learn they have virtually no
source of power or empowerment in arbitration. This fact creates a risk that the parties' normal reference power and personal
qualities power may be diluted through the process of learned
helplessness. 394 This result seems likely because the lack of
power may surprise the parties, who may enter the arbitration
process believing that arbitration will empower them perhaps
even more than would court adjudication. Their participation in
arbitration, therefore, may reduce their confidence in the accu1987); Belanger v. Matteson, 346 A.2d 124, 137-38 (R.I. 1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 968
{1976). See generally Hayford & Peeples, supra note 368, at 375-76.
391. Schwartz, supra note 349, at 15.
392. Drinane v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 606 N.E.2d 1181, 1183 {Ill. 1992);
Hendler & Murray P.C. v. Lambert, 511 N.Y.S.2d 941, 942 (N.Y. App. Div. 1987). See
generally Brunet, supra note 349, at 12-13,33-34 (noting the lack of significant discovery
in all forms of ADR and criticizing the very limited exchange of information allowed in
connection with arbitration).
393. CAL. Civ. PROC. CODE§ 1282.2 (West 1994).
394. See supra notes 81-85 and accompanying text.
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racy of their perceptions. 395

5.

Summary: Application of the Power Model to Arbitration
Arbitration skews the power relationship in unexpected
ways. My concern with this power distortion is twofold. First,
the lack of restraint on arbitrators increases arbitration's potential for harm. The risk of arbitration is that unchecked, excessively powerful arbitrators will use their power to favor those
who already possess power in our society. In other words, cases
may be decided based on the arbitrators' bias or the incentive to
decide cases in such a way as to maximize the possibility of return business. The privacy of arbitration makes these risks particularly disturbing. We can hypothesize that arbitrators reach
poor, biased, and unprincipled results, but we cannot test our
hypothesis.
Second, these concerns are likely to be unknown to parties
when they agree to be bound by arbitration. Kaiser's patients
probably believed they would be treated better in arbitration.
They may have assumed that arbitration is better because it is
faster and cheaper than court adjudication. What parties to arbitrations often find, however, is alienation, bewilderment, and a
sense of running around in circles. The circle begins with the
idea that court adjudication is too expensive and favors those
with greater power in society. It continues with the suggestion .
that ADR, particularly arbitration, may be better. Finally, it returns to the beginning with the reality that arbitration is no better than adjudication and may actually be worse.
V.

CoNCLUSION

The doctrine of unconscionability and the assessment of arbitration as a method of dispute resolution seem almost completely unconnected. 396 Unconscionability is a doctrinal
principle, requiring analysis of specific, case-by-case facts to resolve specific disputes. The assessment of arbitration is a question of system analysis requiring consideration of standards by
395. There are no personal qualities power and reference power issues endemic to
the process of arbitration. Manipulation power is relevant only on a case-by-case basis.
Finally, force power is rarely relevant in arbitration.
396. The only obvious connection between the two is that an arbitration clause
may be a product of gross inequality of power between one party who wants such a
clause and another who does not.
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which dispute systems can be measured and a determination of
whether arbitration is an effective process for resolving disputes.
Unconscionability law and the assessment of arbitration can
be linked, although in a somewhat unexpected way. Procedurally unconscionable contracts and arbitration procedures present
problems with process that can produce problems with result.
Unconscionability doctrine is a response to a concern with a specific type of bad result-unfair contracts. Courts of equity, then
the drafters of the Restatement of Contracts, and, finally, the
drafters of the U CC responded to this concern by developing
doctrine that allows courts to consider the fairness of bargains.
The notion of procedural unconscionability397 reflects a belief
that unfair bargains usually are the product of unfair bargaining
processes. Similarly, authors like Brunet, Fiss, Rueben, and Delgado argue that arbitration may produce bad, unfair, or biased
results. This Article suggests that the undesirable results produced by arbitration are the product of an unfair process, a process that greatly inflates the decision maker's power while
deflating the parties' power. Taken together, unconscionability
doctrine and the insights into arbitration offered in this Article
suggest that distortions of power in a process may produce distorted results.
The purpose of this Article has been to expose the vectors
of power to close examination. In addition, this Article demonstrates the relevance of those vectors to the operation of legal
doctrine and to the assessment of dispute resolution procedure.
In so doing, the importance and pervasiveness of power is revealed. Power clearly matters.
We also can see the benefit of an in-depth, multivector
model of power. In their contracts casebook, Professors Crandall and Whaley tell law students that, "[u]nconscionability is a
wild card doctrine in our law ... [and] ... unconscionability has
been attacked as meaningless, untamable, [and] dangerous." 398
The language Crandall and Whaley chose-"wild," "untamable," "dangerous"-is too visceral to ignore. The image is one
of a wild animal roaming the streets, to be feared and guarded
against.
397. See supra notes 185-187 and accompanying text.
398. THOMAS D. CRANDALL & DOUGLAS J. WHALEY, CASES,
MATERIALS ON CoNTRAcrs 785 (2d ed. 1993) (emphasis added).
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Why is unconscionability perceived as being so threatening?
The fear cannot stem from unconscionability's focus on bad bargains; courts of equity have refused to enforce bad bargains for
years. 399 An answer may lie within the concept of power itself.
As Foucault suggests, power is the continuation of force by other
means. 400 Power, in other words, maintains and reifies itself. As
long as the consideration of power is an exception to a general
discourse that favors preserving the existing system of contract,
and as long as the few unconscionability cases that explicitly address power do so superficially, there is no danger to the existing
social structure.
A discourse about the hegemony and prevalence of
power-in contract making, dispute resolution, and other phases
of human interaction-also can be seen as dangerous and untamable, at least dangerous to current distributions of power in
our society. It allows us to recognize that contracts and arbitration are part of an overarching institution through which power
pervades our lives. It affords us the opportunity to confront that
institution and ask whether another way might work better. For
these reasons, I have proposed this model. Electrical power became a tool for human benefit once it was understood; an understanding of the vectors of human power may not light up a room,
but it might illuminate power operations otherwise invisible and,
thereby, challenge the existing social structure.

399. See supra note 174 and accompanying text.
400. Foucault, supra note 9, at 89.

